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THE LOGIC OF RELIGION

A DISSERTATION

SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY
OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF ARTS AND LITERATURE
IN CANDIDACY FOR THE DEGREE OF
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

DEPARTMENT OF SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY IN THE
GRADUATE DIVINITY SCHOOL


BY

ARTHUR CLINTON WATSON

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
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TO THE
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CHAPTER I

THE CONCEPTION OF RELIGION

Reflection is evoked by the discovery that "things are not what they seem." Serious speculation as to the nature of the reality underlying the world's appearances began with Thale's crude cosmology and ran a free and vigorous course to the time of Plato's idealism and Democritus' atomism. But one who could review with some degree of impartiality the various conclusions of all these metaphysical speculations found a new problem in the fact that their results were marked by such a glaring lack of agreement. Such divergence as culminated in the antipodal differences between Plato and Democritus surely proved the failure of speculation to arrive at truth. Naturally then this activity of thought became itself a problem of investigation. Greek thought had come to an *impasse*. It was time for someone to inquire as to the processes of thought whereby truth was being sought. This was the work of Aristotle, the creator of logical science. There had, of course, been foreshadowings of it in the need felt by Socrates and Plato for more exact definition of ideas and terms. It remained for Aristotle to see and attempt to solve the general difficulty in a large and permanent way. "Aristotle made the great step in advance : . . . the ripe self-knowledge of Greek science. . . . He offers an examination of the thinking activity on all sides, a comprehensive examination of its regular forms."¹

So much for the original occasion of logic in the narrower sense as a branch of philosophy. In general, a similar situation is involved in the development of any department of human activity. When we come to a point where our technique, our intellectual tools, our philosophy of the conduct in question, breaks down or involves us in serious embarrassment, we instinctively turn back upon that philosophy, that technique, to inquire what is wrong

¹ Windelband, *Geschichte der Philosophie*, Engl. trans. by Tufts, *History of Philosophy*, 2d ed., pp. 132, 133.

with it that it now fails to solve our problems or accomplish our tasks. This examination, or its results as an organized system of principles, is the logic of the activity in question, be it the logic of thinking, or the logic of science, or the logic of morality, or the logic of religion.

The logic of religion is needed at the same strategic moment as is the logic of any other department of human development, namely, when, on the one hand, after much groping, successes and failures become gradually sifted, main lines of movement become distinguished from side issues, and, in general, the conditions of successful experimentation become more and more clearly recognized; and when, on the other hand, the need of strong, united, and unhesitating advance has become urgent. In religion we have now somewhat adequately taken stock of the past few centuries of action and reaction, confused groping and occasional clear glimpses of larger perspectives, and with increasing conviction realize the imperative social need of confident and comprehensive progress. Hence our greatest immediate need is a clear apprehension of the logic of the task we are undertaking.

We need religion, probably, as much as any age can have needed it. The prevalent confusion, "the tumult of the time disconsolate," is felt in every mind not wholly inert as a greater or less distraction of thought, feeling, and will; and we need to be taught how to live with joy and calm in the presence of inevitable perplexities. A certain natural phlegm is a great advantage in these days, and better still, if we could get it, would be religious assurance. Never was it more urgent or more difficult to justify the ways of God to men. Our material betterment is a great thing, and our comparative freedom a greater, but these rather increase than diminish the need of a higher discipline in the mind that is to use them profitably; the more opportunities the more problems. Social betterment is like the advance of science in that each achievement opens up new requirements. There is no prospect that the world will ever satisfy us, and the structure of life is forever incomplete without something to satisfy the need of the spirit for ideas and sentiments that transcend and reconcile all particular aims whatsoever. Mediaeval religion is too unworldly, no doubt, for our use, but all real religion has its unworldly side, and Thomas à Kempis and the rest were right in holding that no sort of tangible achievement can long assuage the human soul.

Still more evident is the need of religion in the form of "social salvation," of the moral awakening and leadership of the public mind. Society is in want of this, and the agency that supplies the want will have the power that goes

with function—if not the church, then some secular and perhaps hostile agency, like socialism, which is already a rival to the church for the allegiance of the religious spirit.¹

This is not the first time in the history of Western thought that men have attacked the problem of clarifying the logic of religion. The great work of Thomas Aquinas is significant from the viewpoint of present-day progressive thought chiefly for its crystallization of the logic involved in the religious thought of the Western world up to his day. Others, to be sure, had attempted the same task, and indeed, somewhat less clearly, attained the same result.

Hitherto there had been no formal distinction between the domain of philosophy and that of theology. Thomas laid down a clear line between theology and philosophy, between natural and revealed religion, and the province of reason as regards both, which has remained in force among thinkers of all creeds ever since. Philosophy passes from the consideration of the creatures to God; theology passes from God to the creature.²

But now we come upon evidence that this Thomist contribution to the logic of religion is no longer valid. That it has been, up until recently, is, to be sure, quite true. But theological pioneers today are claiming that theology, as well as philosophy, must pass "*from the consideration of the creatures to God,*" that theology must be *inductive*, that doctrine must be formulated empirically. We are demanding a

theology, which in all sincerity asks the questions which are pressed from the hearts of men; which in its questioning uses fearlessly the best methods which critical science can furnish; which insists on no aristocratic privilege of definitely limited authoritative doctrines, but admits gladly to its precincts anything which compels the moral adoration of men; which learns gratefully from the past, but looks to a better future; which appreciates the service rendered by those conceptions of God and of salvation which have emerged in history, but confidently believes that the borders of our knowledge may ever be enlarged.³

On the one hand, this is demanded by the spirit of the age, and, on the other, by the exigencies of the theological situation. For the formerly credible method of arriving *at* a consideration of the

¹ Cooley, *Social Organization*, p. 379.

² Workman, *Christian Thought to the Reformation*, p. 231.

³ G. B. Smith, *Social Idealism and the Changing Theology*, p. 243.

creatures *from* the consideration of God has been discredited by modern knowledge beyond all repair. The logic of the Thomist system needs no further elaboration. The system itself is utterly obsolete.

Now from the point where Catholicism loses connection with the advancing thought of Modernism, religion, in the progressive sphere, has moved on instinctively, without a conscious logic of its own movement. For several centuries it has been groping its way, marked by inconsistencies and reactions, but surprisingly vital in many directions. But more and more the inconsistencies have become embarrassing. More and more we have wanted a new theology that should be in fact as new as the new world of Modernism. More and more is felt the need of apprehending the deepest logic of the modern religious task. To put it baldly, we modern men are striving to make ourselves at home, religiously, in this new world of modern knowledge. We have tried to move much of the intellectual furniture of the old world, the mediaeval home, into the new, only to find it increasingly incongruous. It will not fit. We have not made ourselves at home. Just what is it we are trying to do? We feel the religious craving within us; we get help from this or that suggestion; we seem to make some progress, but feel much perplexity. The whole task is as yet tragically incomplete. We are thrown back on ourselves. Just what is it we need to do? In a word, What *is* religion?

Furthermore, we are beginning to see that the logic of a modern religion must rest upon the logic of all religion. We understand the logic of the Catholic system. We understand also the logic of secular Modernism. But through both eras men feel religious needs and find religious satisfaction, and what we do not yet clearly understand is the logic of religion which is involved in both these eras and underlies both, the complete system of Aquinas and the nascent system of Modernism. It is not enough to seek for the logic of modern religion. We have come to a place where the very life of religion is threatened by the sickening sense of relativism which modern historical research so largely and increasingly fosters. If we are but seeking one sort of religion to replace another, an obsolete sort, this self-conscious relativism threatens the very

heart of religious power. What we need, before we can have any sufficient confidence in our modern religion, whatever it may prove to be when matured, is a knowledge of the logic of religion *as a whole*. We are confronted with three vast eras, Paganism, Catholicism, Modernism. As we believe in the continuity of experience, we are compelled to understand the principles which underlie all three. We may be satisfied to understand the logic of other phases of human experience in a more or less disjointed way, to know, for example, the logic of ancient science, the logic of mediaeval science, the logic of modern science, but the very heart of religious satisfaction is gone if we thus separate the religious experience of one age from that of another. For the logic of Mediaevalism and that of Modernism are so disparate, the former seems so unreal, so futile, as compared with the latter, and yet the religious experience of the mediaevalist was so profound, so powerful, that our effort to establish a modern religion is likely to seem to ourselves a mere *tour de force*, and futile at that. Yet in spite of the self-consciousness of our effort we feel that the same great forces are driving us forward which compelled the mediaevalist and the ancient to develop their systems. (It is an understanding of these forces on the most inclusive scale that we need.) It is the logic of religion that we must discover, and not merely the logic of Paganism or the logic of Catholicism or the logic of Modernism, if our experience is to be relieved of the oppressive self-consciousness which now disheartens us.)

We have a modern religious spirit or attitude or conscience, but as yet practically no modern religious doctrine. To be sure, it is only slowly and with great difficulty that this strictly modern attitude has come to clear expression. It is as yet hardly more than an awareness of the moral challenge of the scientific spirit and a desire to meet that challenge if possible. It is not yet clear how this strictly modern attitude can produce a strictly religious content. Science and religion have been at odds so long that now, when a truce is felt to be desirable, it still remains doubtful whether it is really feasible. Paganism made religion the affair of commerce with an invisible world, Catholicism made that invisible world a strictly "other" world, and with this "other" world, for fifteen

centuries, religion, as the chief business of man, had entirely to do; and now, when modern knowledge has dissolved that "other" world into utter unthinkableness, and has made cogent the demand for an inductive, an empirical, theology, has, in a word, thrown the religious nature back inevitably upon "this" world, the religious thinker is for the time being embarrassed. Before we can go farther, we must find a satisfactory answer to the question, What *is* religion?

There is so much fundamentally the same in Catholicism and traditional Protestantism that the logic of the two systems may be considered identical, at least in the most important elements.

There is a remarkable unity in the history of Protestant thought in the period from the Reformation to the end of the eighteenth century. There is still more surprising unity of Protestant thought in this period with the thought of the mediaeval and ancient church. The basis and methods are the same. Upon many points the conclusions are identical. There was nothing of which the Protestant scholastics were more proud than of their agreement with the Fathers of the early church. They did not perceive in how large degree they were at one with Christian thinkers of the Roman communion as well. Few seem to have realized how largely Catholic in principle Protestant thought has been. The fundamental principles at the basis of the reasoning have been the same. The notions of revelation and inspiration were identical. The idea of authority was common to both, only the instance in which that authority is lodged was different. The thoughts of God and man, of the world, of creation, of providence and prayer, of the nature and means of salvation are similar.¹

Now a dualism, "this world" and "the other world," is fundamental to this logic of Catholicism and traditional Protestantism. This dualism has been in process of dissolution for a long time, and in degree as this process becomes more advanced we should expect to find the question, What is religion? coming more and more strategically into prominence. And this is exactly what has happened. The last century witnessed the culmination of that process of dissolution, and it was Schleiermacher, at the dawn of the century, who laid the foundations for a new epoch in theology by asking the crucial question, (What is religion?) Kant had practically retired the age-old dualism and so had felt compelled to attempt

¹ See E. C. Moore, *Christian Thought since Kant*, p. 2.

to re-define religion. But both definitions retained, though with necessary vagueness, the sense of an "other" world. For Kant, religion was a sense of duty, duty with, as it were, overtones of a divine imperative, the categorical imperative "within," which somehow has the "intelligible" ("other") world back of it. For Schleiermacher, religion was a feeling of dependence upon a God who is for the most part immanent in "this" world, and yet is apprehended through the God-consciousness of Jesus which has, in the final analysis, some sort of alien source. Ritschl also wrestled with the problem of defining religion, spurning both metaphysics and mysticism as the sphere or channel of its operation, and yet striving to save it from being swallowed up by secularism. The discredit of metaphysics and mysticism was essentially the discredit of the "other" world. The vast change going on in the world-view of the century is reflected in the most characteristic contribution of Ritschl, namely in his doctrine of justification and reconciliation, according to which salvation is essentially a matter of "this" world—a matter of reconstructed character, not of "other worldly" rescue. Ritschl defines religion as a sense of "values." Theology rests upon "value-judgments," whereas science and the secular life in general rest upon "existential judgments." But in Ritschl also there lurks, in the last analysis, the old ontological dualism.

The "other" world, from the days of its creation by the genius of Plato, has been a "given" world, an a priori world, and while, and in so far as, it remains valid for religious thinkers the definition of religion will naturally be an a priori conception. Kant's, Schleiermacher's, Ritschl's definitions are all of this a priori sort. As the very expression "origin of species" is the final stroke in the retirement of Platonism,¹ so the very expression "a psychology of religious experience" is the final stroke in the retirement of the habit of conceiving religion as a bridging of that gulf which the old dualism involves. When, about fifteen years ago, William James published his *The Varieties of Religious Experience*, a most significant milestone was reached. In place of a priori or arbitrary definitions of religion, the attempt was begun of finding an inductive definition by the application of psychological study to the phenomena of

¹ See Dewey, *Influence of Darwin*.

religious experience. While some psychologists of religion are careful to defend their attempt by disclaiming to believe that religion has no extra-scientific or preternatural reference, this apology cannot hide the real issue, for the application of scientific method to the study of religious experience logically implies the end of the old dualism. The "other" world is *not* "other" if it can be reached by a religious experience which is itself a part of "*this*" world's life—comes, that is, really under the cognizance of science.

It is noteworthy that the phraseology of the title of this epoch-marking book¹ is suggestive of the most obvious character of the whole field of religious experience, most obvious and perhaps most discouraging to the investigator who desires to find a definition. The "varieties" of religious phenomena are indeed bewilderingly numerous. The whole field of pagan, Catholic, and modern types stretches before us, subjective and objective, feeling, fact, and fancy, social custom and individual idiosyncrasy, emotions, activities, beliefs. It is little wonder if this branch of science hesitates, is hardly yet sure of having a really scientific method of procedure. Indeed the initial difficulty is to say what is rightful material for investigation. What *is* religious experience? What is morality—what is mere crass custom—what is primitive science? Obviously some tentative conception of the essential character of religious experience must be entertained before the selection of material can be even begun. And in this connection it is noticeable that while so far there is no unanimity of definition, there yet is a very large consensus as to what experiences are and what are not religious. Any working conception of the essence of religion must first of all demonstrate itself in this field of unquestioned religious phenomena. The final test of the definition will be the clarity with which it makes differentiation possible in the large margins of debatable material. More explicitly, the two chief requirements which we must make of any definition offered are these: First, it must account for the *varieties* of religious experience; that is, it must offer a simple and satisfactory clue to the infinite differences of expression of the religious life, in all lands and in all ages, and thus reveal their functional or dynamic identity. In the second place, it must serve to differ-

¹ James, *The Varieties of Religious Experience*.

entiate religion from morality, science, aesthetics, or any other department of custom or culture. Of course it may be supposed by some that the identity of religion is not merely functional or dynamic, but that there is an identity as it were of content, that, for instance, the essential mark of religion is a belief in some supernatural or superhuman agency, i.e., the *deity* content. But the majority of the psychologists of religion claim that this is not tenable. Again, it may be supposed that no ultimate differentiation between religion and, say, morality, is possible. Ames's conclusion is practically that.¹ But as there is an almost universal feeling that while religion and morality are indisputably very intimately connected, they nevertheless are essentially different, surely no definition of religion which does not explain both their difference and their intimate connection can be considered adequate.

The first of these two requisites of a definition calls for further comment. It means that the Hegelian rather than the Aristotelian logical viewpoint must be held, that a "concrete" rather than an "abstract universal" must be discovered.

The universals of the traditional subsumptive logic are found by analysis and abstraction, the discovery of identity by elimination of differences, the classification of species under genera by attention to similarities and disregard of discrepancies. It gives the "abstract universal," the quality or group of qualities which account for or include the similarity of the various species in the genus. It was the service of Hegel to formulate a theory of "concrete universals." It is significant that this revolutionary logical innovation came just at a time when Darwin's *Origin of Species* was about to give the final blow to the Platonic world-view which was the metaphysical background of the Aristotelian logic.² Whereas the "abstract universal" dealt with species generically, the "concrete universal" deals with them genetically or at least organically. The former is based on identities, the latter is based on differentiation. The former looks for a means of classification, the latter for a means of control. The one depends upon analysis of a "given," the other seeks for the secret of creating new

¹ E. S. Ames, *The Psychology of Religious Experience*.

² See Dewey, *The Influence of Darwin on Philosophy*, chap. i.

experience. The first looks for the common elements in similar results, the second looks for the *reason for the differences*. The one belongs to a static world, the other to a changing, growing world. The one deals with completed structures, the other with living functions. The one relies upon authority, whether the authority is a "given" of the philosopher's insight, as Aristotle thought, or of the prophet's vision, miracle-attested, as the theologian claimed, or of a system of truth, as the ecclesiastic held. The other relies upon experiment, exploration, discovery; it is the logic of science. The one talks of essence, substance, "nature," being. The other talks of activities, uses, functions, life. Principal Caird gives the following description of Hegel's concrete or organic universal.

This deeper and truer universality is that which may be designated ideal or organic universality. The idea of a living organism is not a common element which can be got at by abstraction and generalization, by taking the various parts and members, stripping away their differences, and forming a notion of that which they have in common. That in which they differ is rather just that out of which their unity arises and in which is the very life and being of the organism; that which they have in common they have, not as members of a living organism, but as dead matter, and what you have to abstract in order to get it is the very life itself. We do not reach it by first thinking the particulars, but conversely we get at the true notions of the particulars only through the universal.¹

In the first place, the "varieties" of religious experience are so infinitely various that if the method of abstraction is used there is little or no hope of finding the residual identity; and in the second place, if such could be found it would necessarily be so vague, so utterly "abstract," as to furnish no valuable clues in attacking our own peculiar twentieth-century reconstructive problem. The abstraction of a bare "deity" content, as the mark of all religious experience, even if it were defensible, is impotent in our present situation. The validity of theism is the very crux of our reconstructive problem. It is no help to be told simply that to be religious we must have a God. Those who have had their theism dissolved by modern knowledge are thus thrown back upon the alternative of irreligion, while nevertheless, in the agonies of their

¹ Caird, *Introduction to Philosophy of Religion*, 1891, p. 218; see also Royce, *The Spirit of Modern Philosophy*, pp. 222 ff.

enforced atheism, they feel themselves to be poignantly religious. What they need is such an understanding of their religious hunger as will afford some clear line of attack upon the very heart of their problem, some immediately workable line of procedure which they may patiently and without embarrassment explore.

It would not be surprising if among the earliest attempts to define religion inductively a mixture of these two viewpoints should result—an “abstract” universal which is superficially “dynamic.” And indeed this is what we find in a definition which has had considerable influence in recent discussions—Höfding’s characterization of religion as “the conservation of values.” This view regards religion as a function of society whose nature is seen in its most general results. That is, after reviewing the whole field of religious activities, the conclusion is reached that the only thing which can be said of religion which is true in all cases is that these various religious activities tend to “conserve values.” But the abstract and impotent character of this definition is evident the moment we ask what such a conception means when applied to our present reconstructive task. What is religion for us? It is a conservation of values. What shall we do? We must practice such religious exercises, hold such religious beliefs, as shall tend to conserve the “values” of life which are regarded as in some way involved. Now if it be felt that all traditional forms of religion have become impotent to conserve our felt “values” (and this is just the core of our modern difficulty), we are accordingly forced to consider the invention of such forms of worship and such doctrines as may prove effective in the situation. But surely the artificiality of such a position, the self-consciousness of such an undertaking, is utterly embarrassing. Moreover, it is not apparent how religion differs from any other department of life, for surely science and morality are no less truly means of “conserving values.” In spite of the apparently “concrete” character of this “universal,” its dynamic appearance, its evolutionary, functional terminology, Höfding’s definition is really an “abstract” universal; it deals fundamentally, not with the cause of differences, but with residual similarities. It is essentially static. It reviews results rather than concrete motives, it deals with consequences rather than impulses.

It is an abstraction from finished systems rather than an insight into underlying motivation. No doubt it is entirely true that, as James¹ at the outset of this whole investigation pointed out, there is no specific religious "nature," no peculiar "religious instinct"; nevertheless we do not profoundly understand either religion or any other human experience unless we see it from its instinctive side rather than from that of its overt activities and achieved results. There is a great practical difference between the questions, What is the function of religion? and Of what is religion the function?

The author of this study believes that he has to suggest a definition of religion entirely different from any that have hitherto been put forward, and one which (1) is broad enough to include practically all the phenomena which the various psychologists of religion have fastened upon as religious; (2) is practical enough to suggest a natural method of differentiation in those marginal regions where religion seems indistinguishable from morality, or science, or art; (3) is "concrete" enough to explain the endless variation, in form and content, of religious experience; and (4) is so dynamic as to simplify our present reconstructive task and to suggest the most promising lines of advance.

But before stating it, let me further describe the "abstract" method in contrast with which this definition will be proposed.

The deductive, merely descriptive character of this "abstract" method is most clearly seen in the results of Professor Wright's analysis.² He points out that there are three types of definition thus far proposed: the first following the general direction of Höfding's solution, the second insisting on the supernatural or superhuman agency as an ever-present factor, and the third giving the chief importance to the "feeling" element. Professor Wright argues that each of these is correct with reference to some large mass of facts, and that if we are to find a definition which shall disregard no single religious fact we must include each of these three factors. He therefore defines religion as "the endeavor to secure the conservation of socially recognized values through specific

¹ *The Varieties of Religious Experience.*

² "A Psychological Definition of Religion," *American Journal of Theology*, XVI (1912), 385.

actions that are believed to evoke some agency different from the ordinary ego of the individual or from other merely human beings, and that imply a feeling of dependence on this agency."¹

Now Dr. Wright himself seems to feel the abstract and merely descriptive character of this generalization though not willing to admit its futility. He says: "Perhaps the reader now feels that after all the definition merely affords a descriptive formulation of religion and assists in placing it in a classification along with other disciplines, but that it does not throw much light upon the questions in which he is most interested."²

Now the "abstract universal" is just as legitimate in its place as the "concrete." The Aristotelian logic has had such a long life because it is just the everyday attitude which we take toward the well known and familiar. It sums up experience in useful and concise concepts. It is at home in the periods of authority. The major premise is essentially the epitomized custom of the group.³ The "abstract universal" is useful when what is wanted is a more facile use of accumulated experience or a reinforcing of a long-accepted custom or truth. And that just this is the problem which Dr. Wright has in mind becomes evident in the latter part of his monograph. He holds that the use of such a definition will enable us to discover that religion has always been more or less successful in conserving social values (though to be sure it has oftener than not done so unconsciously by other means than those which it was explicitly employing, "suggestion" rather than the deity being the real agency); has generally produced a certain amount of social and moral solidarity and conservatism with the group; has often fostered a less sordid type of life than otherwise might have prevailed; and has helped to enrich and expand the personal life. And so he is interested in showing the importance of preserving, for the sake of general social usefulness, the function of religion as a conservational force tending to maintain our higher values. His

¹ *Op. cit.*, pp. 388, 392.

² *Op. cit.*, p. 402.

³ Cf. "The Concept in its very generality . . . is the conserver of the experience of the past. It is the custom of the past put into capitalized and funded form to enable the individual to get away from the stress and competition of the needs of the passing moment" (Dewey, *Influence of Darwin on Philosophy*, p. 293).

remarks on the metaphysical validity of religion reveal the same attitude. On any one of the three types of philosophical foundation which contemporary thought affords, religion, he thinks, can claim to be dealing with reality in general and so is worthy of confidence and support. "In a word, the social and personal usefulness of religion once established, the question of its metaphysical validity will largely take care of itself."¹ In short, the present need seems to this writer to be to deduce the social value of religion today from the generalization that religion is a useful social institution. This is so characteristic of contemporary apologists that its significance for the logic of the situation should be carefully noted. If the continuance of religion as a social institution is the heart of our problem, then the deductive logic must have its way, and an abstract universal is the sort of definition that we need. But if the problem is actually much more acute than that, if it is expressed in its most crucial form in a widespread need of individuals rather than in a general social indifference; if the core of the difficulty for a multitude of the most earnest and thoughtful persons is, not "Shall we continue to be religious?"; but rather "*How* can we continue to be religious?"; if the metaphysical question is, not of the validity of religion in general, but of the validity of the individual's beliefs and practices in particular; then surely the logic needed is an inductive logic, and the abstract definition is not adequate to the present situation. Moreover, it is impossible to find an abstract definition without retaining some one or more of the elements of the content of the religious experience of the past from which the generalization is made, if at least the definition is to have any semblance of real working value. Höffding's definition, for instance, does not help us on our way in the explicit religious perplexities which confront us. It simply gives us a broader acquaintance with religion as it has been; it does not discover anything new. This weakness is apparently overcome in Wright's definition by the addition of the element of belief in the other-than-merely-human agency which is evoked by the religious activity. This is simply some deity or its equivalent. But this is a pure a priori, as far as the poignancy of the present situation is concerned. Everyone

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 409.

admits the helpfulness of believing in the co-operation of some deity. But that only adds to the embarrassment of the present problem, for the very crux of the difficulty is, "What God *can* I believe in?"

In its simplest statement, I would say that *religion is a social attitude toward the non-human environment*. The *quality* of religion will of course vary with the degree of organization of the social attitude and with the dimensions of the non-human environment; with the degree in which the various social attitudes are habitual and customary, or purposeful and conscious; with the extent to which the non-human environment has been personified by the social imagination or depersonalized by the rational processes induced by failure of habitual adjustments.

Or to state it otherwise: Broadly speaking, the most far-reaching and important distinction which we make regarding the world we live in is that line which we draw between "man" and "not man"; while our relations to environment fall into two classes, first, social adjustments, mostly made toward our fellow-men, and, secondly, mechanical, manipulatory adjustments, which are mostly made toward the things about us. The first constitute the sphere of morality, the second constitute the sphere of science. But, of course, these spheres are not water-tight compartments; there are endless cross-currents. For example, we may take the mechanical attitude toward men and treat them as *things* (which is either non-moral or immoral). On the other hand, it is inevitable that sometimes we take a social attitude toward the non-human environment. *Within this latter general set of relations is the sphere of religious experience*. Violent or sudden stimulus tends to arouse the whole organism to activity, so that any situation which transcends the efficiency of our acquired mechanical attitudes tends to call forth the larger organic response, or social attitude.¹ The

¹ It is not meant of course that the mere muscular exertion of the whole body is necessarily a social attitude. What is meant is that the more the resources of the entire organism are challenged, the more the response tends to assume the social quality. Briefly, the reason for this is the predominance, both in number and in importance, of the social instincts. The social environment of primitive man is composed of both animals and men. Wild beasts and savage foes require alertness of the whole organism to escape or overcome danger. Moreover, the welfare of childhood, both in primitive and in civilized life, depends much more upon successful social

mechanical attitudes are attitudes of only parts of the organism, whereas the social attitudes are attitudes of the whole organism. The most mechanical activity may develop into one genuinely social, as difficulty is encountered and vital needs are at stake. For instance, a savage is trying to lift a log. At first the action is merely muscular, quite mechanical, and devoid of emotional interest. But the log is heavy or it rolls out of the arm's grasp or it falls back on the man's foot and threatens to crush that member. In other words, as the difficulty of the enterprise increases, as the struggle proceeds, it becomes dangerous to his very life. Gradually or suddenly the whole organism becomes more and more involved, so that at last the savage regards the log as he would regard his bitterest foe, with hatred, anger, suspicion. This *social* attitude is expressed in a curse or a final kick, fear or grinning triumph. It is not otherwise with a civilized, sophisticated human. We stoop mechanically to pick up some slippery object, but say things under our breath when it eludes our grasp with the appearance of diabolic cunning. So one may curse the loose board of a plank sidewalk which trips him up; or one may apostrophize some object in nature, as I heard a friend do recently, on a fine morning in the Rockies, "O! you grand old mountains!" *In this realm of social attitudes toward the non-human is the sphere of religion.* We do not today, of course, dignify by the name religion the anger which one may feel toward the door which the wind slams in his face, but the same attitude in primitive man we call animism¹ and feel that if animism is not exactly religion, it is at least the stuff out of which religion is evolved. Neither do we call it religion when someone of a poetical temperament breaks out in speech to

adjustments than upon mechanical adjustments. The power of the gregarious and sex interests is obvious. Further, the mechanical adjustments are developed and controlled largely by the reflex equipment, and hence unconsciously, whereas the more important social adjustments require continuous attention. Hence, in general, the more vitally our physical environment stimulates us, the more is our whole, fundamentally social, nature aroused. A social stimulus awakens what I may call the pan-organic response. On the other hand, the pan-organic response, even though aroused by physical stimulation, is social in its tone. This, very briefly, is my defense for using the expression "the larger organic response, or social attitude."

¹ Or more strictly "animatism," to use Marett's term.

a mountain or the moonlight; yet the very same attitude, if organized into a social habit, elaborated more or less in ritual or defended by doctrine, we should not hesitate to call a religion, "a sun-cult," or what not.

It is admitted that a very hard-and-fast line of distinction cannot be drawn between the two types of attitude, the social and the mechanical, nor between the two types of environment, human and non-human. There are, to be sure, mechanical phases of every social attitude, as in the handclasp of friendship some of the same motor reactions take place as in the use of a hammer or saw. On the other hand, the social quality never seems to recede very far from the surface of mechanical adjustments, as in the use of tools and materials the workman is not always utterly indifferent to them—he is likely at any moment to exhibit a sort of fondness for them or impatience with them. So too with the human and non-human environments. We bestow affection upon our favorite dog or horse, we talk to the bird or the cat. Every employer feels the power of the "economic man" theory, in his temptation to treat workmen as so many tools, mere "things," to be hired, used, cast aside; in the crowded streets we pass most passers-by as indifferently as we step aside to avoid a lamp-post or other non-human obstacle. What is claimed in this study is not that these lines of distinction can be drawn with unwavering definiteness and secure fixity, but that these are the poles, as it were, about which our activities cluster; these are the foci about which our life swings, the contour of action being apparently closer now to this, now to that, center of control. Indeed, to push this last suggestion a little bit, one might say that as the one focus of the ellipse and its more adjacent curve may represent social responses toward the human environment, and the other focus and its more adjacent curve may represent mechanical responses to the non-human environment, as the curve is never, save at two bare points, obedient to the one or the other focus exclusively, so our life is never, save at two bare, logically but hardly empirically real, points, obedient exclusively to either the social or the non-social, never either starkly mechanical nor utterly social; and it is just this cross-reference, so to speak, this response of the curve at one extremity to the focus at the other,

this rising and falling stimulation of the social responses by the non-human environment, *that constitutes the realm of religion.*

Having roughly outlined the logical limits of religious experience as being "social attitudes toward the non-human environment," some further explanation is now necessary. Obviously much falls within that general scheme today which we should not call religious, although, as I suggested above, any example of similar attitudes, found in the dim primitive past, would probably be considered religious. It will throw light on this phase of my task to look at morals and science from the general viewpoint suggested. There are the two types of environment, the human and the non-human, and the two types of reaction, or attitude, the social and the mechanical. Within the general sphere of social attitudes toward the human environment, morality develops; within that of the mechanical or non-social attitudes toward the non-human, science; *within that of social attitudes toward the non-human, religion.* Now in all these there are two chief considerations which must be kept in mind. The first is the fact that specialization or development throws some activities into prominence, and *the importance of these is the criterion as to how far they are worthy of the adjectives moral, scientific, or religious,* respectively. Special activities are at first elicited by problem situations and are at that stage imbued with emotional interest. Often these same activities tend to become merely habitual, the emotional interest in them wanes, and they gradually fade into that vast mass of routine which is comparatively colorless. For instance, any deviation from the group custom is primitive immorality. But deviation today is not immoral unless it refers to actions which still retain or have come to have emotional interest. An eccentric mode of dress will be an idiosyncrasy or an immorality according to the degree in which it arouses the emotional interest of the group. Similarly, a new method of registering fares on a street car will be regarded at first as a scientific device, but later will be so commonplace and uninteresting as to seem unworthy of the name scientific. So, too, it is the common criticism of the perfunctory observance of religious rites that such mere habit is unworthy the name of true religion. It is therefore necessary to discover what are the factors that make

any experience or activity within the general logical sphere of religion more or less religious. And no extraneous principle must be brought in to vitiate the fundamental simplicity of the logical situation. The explanation lies first of all in the implications of the expression, "a social attitude." "Social" attitudes vary all the way from the instinctive automatisms of animals in their group behavior, the mating of robins, the scout duties of the lookout crow, the snarls of quarreling dogs, the admonitory paw-slaps of the maternal cat, up to the rhetorical flights of the patriot, the exquisite solicitude of a noble parent, the sympathetic handclasp of a loyal friend. But the element which makes the latter human rather than merely animal is the mergence in a man of a "self"-consciousness. This "self"-consciousness varies in organization, sensitiveness, and other qualities from the quasi-animal beginnings in the child or the savage up to the noblest character of Christian maturity. Now this is the key to the problem of the specifically moral action within the general sphere of social attitudes toward the human environment. We say that any action is moral rather than non-moral in so far as the self is actively and consciously present therein. To turn to the similar religious problem, we would say that in any social attitude toward the non-human, the attitude is more or less religious according to the degree in which the "self"-consciousness is organized and active. But even as morality depends for its degree of moral-ness, not only upon the self factor but also upon the quality of the human environment within which the self is active, so any experience is more or less religious in proportion as the non-human environment with which the self makes adjustment is large or small, important or trifling. Even as we say that the highest morality is incompatible with provincialism, that a man is not thoroughly moral if he neglects the ballot, that though charity begins at home it cannot stay there, that the business man who has never seen beyond his factory walls is as yet to that extent non-moral, so too the greater the scope of the non-human to which the self, the moral organism, adjusts itself, the more is that adjustment worthy the name religious.

A further word or explanation is in order here. Every vital situation has two chief stages: the problem stage in which active

readjustment is demanded and the solution stage in which the activities which emerge through reflection or experiment go on until some new problem arises. Now the tendency of activities once established to become habitual is useful so long as the situation continues which called them forth and in which they are efficient. This situation, however, may cease to exist, while the habitual activities go on of their own momentum. So long as the situation lasts, the activity is, though habitual, worthy the name "moral" or "religious," as the case may be, but when the situation ceases to exist the habitual activity becomes mere meaningless routine, and less and less worthy the name "moral" or "religious." The point is that "moral" and "religious" are essentially vital terms in that they imply a situation of great interest and importance and are more and more applicable within their respective logical spheres in degree as the adjustments contemplated or achieved are of profound and far-reaching significance.

Again, the expression "non-human" will readily be understood to refer in general either to nature or the supernatural, the so-called physical universe which we directly experience or the so-called spiritual world which we experience by faith or imagination. A *social* attitude to such a world beyond the sensuous as Christianity has conceived is, of course, natural and inevitable, since it is just as truly a social environment as the human. A social attitude toward nature so long as there is this divine social environment beyond nature is for the most part unnecessary and unnatural, since nature is *ipso facto* comparatively devoid of importance. The heart of the modern religious situation is just this, that historico-psychological research has of late increasingly revealed the processes by which that other or divine world, that social environment beyond nature, was built up by the social imagination of primitive man, philosopher, and saint, while at the same time scientific technique and scientific theory have revealed the unexpected importance and vast but inescapable horizons of this world. Our non-human environment is now, at least in our critical and non-traditional moods, not the supernatural, but nature. Much confusion has resulted from the fact that the traditional adjustments have gone on of their own momentum, after the real situation was

vastly changed. But it is not enough to point out this fact, as so many have been so busy doing, and conclude that since our largest environment is now no longer social we need no longer take a social attitude toward it, or, in other words, need no longer be religious. Whereas the divine social environment in which man has so long lived has immensely fostered his growing sense of selfhood or moral self-consciousness, both democracy and science have taken up and carried much farther this thing that the traditional otherworldliness had been doing. Modern life is much more self-conscious, man is much more aware of himself, with the historical background which Darwinism suggests than with the scheme of the Book of Genesis. Over against this self-conscious modern man is nature, with its vast unplumbed significance; and a moral reaction, a social attitude, a "self"-adjustment thereto is no less inevitable, though apparently vastly more difficult, than in the "ages of faith," when man's all-inclusive horizon was a divine society.¹

¹ For the suggestion of the general idea of the distinction between the social and non-social environments, and between the social and mechanical attitudes, I am indebted to Professor G. H. Mead's lectures in social psychology.

It may seem to the reader that a social attitude to the non-human, if that non-human be "nature" or the "world," that is, a social attitude toward a non-social environment, is a contradiction in terms, and religion consequently impossible or an absurdity. This is of course the crux of the constructive problem, which waits for some further investigation of the whole matter of our social and mechanical adjustments out of which have probably come, respectively, our apparently contradictory sets of teleological and mechanistic concepts. For further reference to this point, see succeeding chapters.

CHAPTER II

THE CONCEPTION OF RELIGION (*Continued*)

I have defined religion as *a social attitude toward the non-human environment*, and have shown somewhat in detail the meaning of this definition.

I shall now attempt a fuller description of my position by contrasting it with some representative results of contemporary psychological treatment.

A. First, let me make some further reference to the work of Professor Wright. "The values of religion are all in some sense moral values."¹ True, certainly. But why? If religion is the conservation of socially recognized values, why does it not seek to conserve the vast industrial interests of the land? No values are more fully recognized socially. Yet Dr. Wright's definition does not suggest why these should not today be a matter of concern to religion, nor why the values with which it is concerned should always be in some sense moral. But if, as I have suggested, religion is a social attitude toward the non-human environment, the "self" is always involved; and where the self is involved, the situation is *ipso facto* "in some sense moral." Moreover, whereas ancient industry was very often and very largely a matter of concern to religion, modern industry is not, for the simple reason that the manipulation of the sources of wealth is now a matter of science, inasmuch as non-social or mechanical attitudes have been found by men to be vastly more efficient with reference to such things than the earlier social attitudes were.

Again, "as society advances the general tendency is for religion increasingly to conserve the more important ethical values."² But why? If my thesis is sound, the reason for the phenomenon here referred to is at once patent. The "self"-consciousness, the

¹ "A Psychological Definition of Religion," *American Journal of Theology*, XVI (1912), 399.

² *Ibid.*, p. 400.

moral tone of the group or the individual, at any given stage of development, is the same whether the organism is adjusting itself to the human or to the non-human, and the ethical values which are the more important in one case will also be more important in the other. This statement, i.e., that the "self" is identical in both the human and the non-human situations, of course is not absolutely exact, for the self is ever fluctuating within rather wide limits, shrinking or expanding, waxing or waning in vigor, and this, for the most part, in response to the social environment. There are, however, limits; there is at any period in social evolution, as it were, a "mean temperature" of selfhood or moral tone common to the individual and his group and in large areas of experience. Though, in general, it may be said that the morals of the divine society lag somewhat behind those of the human group whose social imagination has created it (and naturally so, since the constructive imagination cannot work without materials, and those materials must first be produced in the social experience of the group), nevertheless there are more or less definite psychological limits within which the human and the divine codes agree. Herein is the logical explanation of both the truth and the indefiniteness thereof, in the statement that the tendency is for religion to conserve the more important ethical interests. A selfhood in which, for instance, purity has become integral will demand purity in its divine social environment; and when purity is once established in the divine society, it will react powerfully for the fuller establishment of purity in the human group. Again, the proverbial conservatism of religion is explained by the same facts. For the self must be evolved in the human social *milieu* before it can function in the larger non-human environment. The unseen world is comparatively static because it is changed, not by concrete fact immediately, but only indirectly by the slow-moving logic of the earthly facts. The construction of a divine world is a slow and arduous process, and is made stable and solid by reason of the very importance of the self's interests which are localized there. Once completed and perfected, it holds the imagination of individuals and of generations in thrall, and the protests of conscientious iconoclasts make little impression on it. To demand that religion be less conservative

is to fail to realize the ponderous proportions of its task. "Rome" may fairly epitomize the general scheme of Western orthodoxy, and "Rome was not built in a day." Various structures in the Eternal City, such as atonement, God, salvation, may be more or less remodeled with comparative ease (though even here, at close range, the cost in energy and earnestness seems incalculable), but such a wholesale reconstruction as is demanded by the seismic shake-up which modern science and psychology have produced will not be undertaken until all effort to live among the ruins has become too obviously futile, and some consciousness has dawned of the resources of the human nature which builded this city in the past.

Another question which Dr. Wright's essay raises and on which my thesis throws light is that of the relation of religion and aesthetics. For him they are utterly different and distinct. "The differences between aesthetics and religion are so great and their resemblances so superficial that one wonders how the two ever have been confused. The blunder . . . that these features [i.e., music, frescoes, etc.], the merest external adornments and veriest accidents of religion, constituted her heartfelt purpose. . . . The religious endeavor is never an end in itself . . . aesthetic contemplation is interesting on its own account: it is an end in itself."¹ Now, if they are so distinct, how account for their apparent close union? Why is it that some religious persons so vehemently insist that religion is not a matter of aesthetics, while others as earnestly assert that it is? If they are not the same, they are at least inextricably interwoven on abundant evidence. Let me again appeal to my thesis. Religion is an adjustment of the self to its non-human environment. Now in every adjustment there are three logically distinct phases: (1) the initial, "problem," stage, in which emotion, ideation, and volition are all active and preponderant; (2) the smooth working out of the solution, in which emotion dies down into interest, and the actions are automatic and habitual rather than volitional, and the intellectual processes proper are comparatively unnecessary; (3) the appreciative or "economic" stage, in which satisfaction is experienced by means of the successful solution and its actualization. These

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 401.

successive phases may be traced in both physical and social situations, and in any social adjustment whether with the human environment or with the non-human. It extends to large epochal adjustments as well as to the individual's experience. The aesthetic epochs are those in which successful experience tends to symbolize its satisfactions. They are the flowering forth of great cultural or moral or religious achievements. So we have the art of the Greek period, of the Renaissance, of today. Obviously an experience is an end in itself, in degree as it passes into the third, or "economic," phase of adjustment. Thus in many instances a religious mood is an "end in itself," as some mystical types of devotion so well attest. It is just as impossible to regard the classic Christian mood of "communion with God" as having some ulterior motive as to think of the experience of conjugal felicity or the intercourse of ideal friendship as being a means to an end rather than an end in itself. But so also religious experience may have the general character of the first or problem stage marked by stress and strain and great intellectual and emotional activity, or of the calm but interestful second stage when the adjustment activity is in process of actualization.

A further quotation from Dr. Wright's essay will help me to make my meaning clearer. "Ages of comparative religious shallowness like the Italian Renaissance have often produced the finest religious art; while, as in the case of the Puritans, movements of deep religious earnestness have sometimes rejected the services of art altogether."¹ My thesis suggests that to call one "shallow" and the other "deep" is to miss the real comparison. The Italian Renaissance is the culmination of a long process of religious adjustment, whereas the Puritan movement is the beginning of another. The first is religious adjustment or experience in the "economic" stage; the latter is religious experience in the "problem" stage. The one very naturally expresses its overripe "satisfaction" or successful accomplishment in the symbols of sacred art. The other in the strenuous period has no sense of ripe accomplishment as yet to symbolize, but has all its energies absorbed in the practical task on hand. To call the one "shallow" and the other "deep" is as

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 400.

inadequate as to say that the relaxed mood at the end of a hard day's work, when one goes over the day's deeds in reverie or in conversation, is "shallow" as compared with the sweat and dust of the hours of toil. They are both normal phases of the total situation. Similarly, periods of moral reconstruction have their strongly contrasting "problem" and "economic" phases. We fight the great fight of slavery and years later express our appreciation of the importance and success of the task in sculpture, painting, and architecture. We undertake vast industrial problems and soon the sense of having made a beginning at least finds expression in a great mural decoration. Important discoveries are lived over again in pageantry. So the artistic impulse is a normal phase of moral as well as of religious evolution. And in passing, it might be pointed out how the individual aesthetic experience may be regarded as religious. The aesthetic impulse in the individual regarded from the organic functional standpoint is simply the result of racial experience incorporated in the nervous structure of the individual organism. The sense of beauty is organic and instinctive, builded up by many generations. (It may, of course, be liberated by education. The matter of art as a technique of symbolization is aside from the psychological understanding of the aesthetic nature.) But what in its simplest terms is the appreciative attitude which many people instinctively take toward a "beautiful" landscape but the hereditary responsiveness of the organism toward favorable environment? This is of the physical type. The appreciation of a beautiful or noble face is an aesthetic impulse of the moral type. The sensitive soul, however, may gaze upon a beautiful landscape with emotions that he himself cannot define but as religious. What has happened to make the aesthetic moment religious? A sense of selfhood has arisen as he gazes. It is no longer *merely* aesthetic, because the organism is so aroused as to make a total, that is to say, a social, reaction over against the non-human. The aesthetic feeling blends into the religious. Such an aesthetico-religious experience is typically expressed in the lines:

The clouds that gather round the setting sun,
Do take a sober coloring from the eye
That hath kept watch o'er man's mortality.

B. Let us next consider Irving King's *The Development of Religion*.¹ This author thus defines religion: "The religious consciousness is a special development of the valuational attitudes² a special development of the valuational type of consciousness."³ It is obvious that such a statement involves the necessity, first, of distinguishing between the practical and the valuational attitudes; and secondly, that of differentiating that special type of the latter which is religious from other types of the valuational consciousness.

Now the primary criticism to be made upon Professor King's position is that his distinction between "practical" and "valuational" is entirely artificial. For the larger part of the valuational moments of consciousness are as truly practical as anything else. Indeed, it may fairly be said that the more "appreciation" we have of a situation of danger or object of desire the more intensely "practical" it *ipso facto* is.

The trouble with this term "valuational" or "appreciative" is that it may properly refer to three different aspects of activity. In the first place, any action in its third or "economic" stage is practically a mood of appreciation.⁴ In the second place, the pleasure-discomfort tone which accompanies most, if not all, sensations is the organism's instinctive "evaluation" of its stimuli. When this affective tone is very intense, we may sometimes describe it as "appreciative"; for example, one "appreciates" a good square meal when very hungry, one "appreciates" a fire on the hearth after being out in the cold, damp night, one "appreciates" a danger when its perilous aspects have fully aroused the instinct of self-preservation. In the third place, the emergence of "self"-consciousness renders any attitude appreciative or valuational in proportion as the "self" is highly organized and explicit. This is of course the most important of the three factors, and it is this which is the real explanation of the importance of social life in developing a sense of "values" on which King so constantly insists. "The sense of value itself is so thoroughly bound up with

¹ *The Development of Religion*. New York: Macmillan, 1910.

² *Op. cit.*, p. 63.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 44.

⁴ See discussion above, p. 25.

social activities that it may almost be called a social category."¹ But he does not see that the most important result of social intercourse is the creation of self-consciousness, and hence the real psychological connection between the social *milieu* and the sense of value is lost. It is indeed true that "the particular function of the social element is in giving stability and depth to the values brought to consciousness through the rise of intermediate activities,"² but do not these values acquire "stability and depth" just because they become the values not merely of physical organisms but of social "selves"?

Professor King himself seems to admit that he has not made a very successful differentiation. For instance, he says: "It [religion] originates, it is true, to a certain extent in the practical life of a people. . . . It is true that the feelings of appreciation thus gained may be carried over and used in very pressing and practical situations. . . . Prayer and sacrifice, although in a way practical expedients, are also just as truly expressions of an appreciative disposition on the part of the worshiper. . . . One mode of reaction will in many cases be sure to merge with the other. . . ."³ The artificiality of this distinction between practical and valuational attitudes, as such, accounts for some of the strained positions he is compelled to assume. For instance: "Were religion a practical expedient, it would have died out, as magic is doing with the growing sense of inutility."⁴ But religions do die out with the growing sense of their inutility. Religion, in the general sense of what the various religions have tried to do, does not die out and it is equally true that what magic tried to do does not die out. King himself calls magic primitive man's science, and the continuity of the general function which magic attempted is just as real as and no more real than the continuity of the general function of mankind which we call religion.

Passing now to the second task of differentiation which King's position involves, how does he distinguish between those valuational attitudes which are religious and those which are not religious? In

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 64.

³ *Op. cit.*, pp. 172 ff.

² *The Development of Religion*, p. 70.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 172.

general, it seems to be simply a question of the degree of social importance. "As certain of these values stand out and acquire great prominence in the social consciousness, they become in so far religious, and the activities which were before only practical expedients are now transformed into religious ceremonials."¹ Or to put it otherwise, religious values are ultimate values. "That the social organization is practically the *ne plus ultra* of primitive man's life is a most important point for the development of religious values out of those of less degree. . . . Psychologically the values of the group are not only higher than those of the individual, they are genuinely ultimate and universal. This is our argument in a nutshell."² As for modern man, "the religious attitude may be said to be the consciousness of the value of action in terms of its ultimate organization."³ In a word, since religion is "the appreciation of the more permanent and far-reaching values,"⁴ the more permanent and far-reaching the values at stake the more are they to be considered religious. But surely this does not by any means clearly distinguish between religious and moral or scientific values. The very case he cites of the Greenland Eskimo seems to me to expose this.

The social assemblies of the Greenland Eskimos are good examples of "accessory" activities, and their social and aesthetic value is so great and their function as an institution of social control is so evident that they may be considered as religious rites. The Eskimos have, on the other hand, many habits connected with their hunting, but these depend so clearly upon individual skill and painstaking practice and the conditions under which they are called forth are so acute, that they continue almost of necessity quite definably "practical," and hence non-religious.⁵

Now a technique for social control can hardly be said to be of "more permanent and far-reaching" value than a technique for obtaining food, nor can it be said to be less "practical," so that neither King's primary nor secondary criterion for religion seems to be operative in this case. Indeed, the distinction in this case is based upon other consideration than those suggested in the

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 82.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 65.

² *Op. cit.*, p. 68.

⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 100, 101.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 85.

criterion of "ultimacy." "Their social and aesthetic value is so great . . . that they may be considered religious rites." This seems to suggest that religious and aesthetic are very much the same thing, a question to which more explicit attention will be given shortly. Meanwhile it should be noted that other criteria are also introduced as well as this aesthetic quality. "That these are ostensibly religious ceremonies is indicated by their definitely prescribed character and by the various symbolic acts which are intermingled with the more useful expedients."¹ Surely fixity of form and symbolical representation are very different from ultimacy of value as a touchstone for the religious quality of any activity. And why might not a purely moral value find expression in a "definitely prescribed" or "symbolic" activity? It is indeed just the powerlessness of this definition and the somewhat similar one of Professor Ames to reveal any logical distinction between religion and morality that I find most objectionable. "Morality, as its etymology suggests, refers also to the customary, and on this ground we may argue with much assurance for the view that primitive religion and primitive morals are but two sides of the same thing."² But if the distinguishing mark of religious values is their ultimacy, how does this separate religion from the aesthetic? It was suggested above that, in the quotation referred to, they seemed to be practically identical. The question of the difference between them King considers on page 84:

In general it may be said that the difference between them is one of relationships rather than of intrinsic content. Thus the peculiarity of aesthetic values is that they are detached or isolated from the problems of life, while values of the religious type are expressions of these problems in their most ultimate form. But, in any case, there can be no question as to the close connection of the two attitudes, and in all probability they are always intermingled.

King's theory seems to afford no clear differentiation between religion and morality, or between religion and aesthetics.

Before leaving King's treatment of the subject, I wish to illustrate further my own conception of religion by using one of the

¹ *The Development of Religion*, p. 105.

² *Ibid.*, p. 28.

important instances which he cites in support of his. Referring to the dances of the bushmen, he says:

We pass from these activities in which the sportive element seems to predominate to others of a more religious character. . . . There was certainly no sharply dividing line between the religious and the non-religious in these cases. . . . Their ceremonial dances were specializations from a perfectly spontaneous manifestation of primitive joyousness. . . . Among other primitive peoples these same activities came in many instances to express to their doers some sort of ultimate worthfulness. That is, the meaning of their lives, as far as they were able to conceive it, was in some way bound up with the moon, with the sun, with certain natural phenomena, such as thunder storms, or with food itself; and as a consequence, the activities which had gradually crystallized about these intense centers of interest, since they were literally the expression of the relation of the people to the things, and were the only means by which they could think of that relation—these activities, we repeat, became religious ceremonials in the true sense.¹

In this quotation the two essential principles which I suggested in my definition are very suggestively illustrated, namely, the element of self-consciousness, or feeling of self-worth, and the non-human environment. "The meaning of their lives was in some way bound up with the moon," etc., and hence "these activities, since they were literally the expression of the relation of the people to these things . . . became religious ceremonies in the true sense." In the evolution of the religious dance, out of the mere overflow of animal spirits in the moonlight, the point at which religion appears is the point at which moral consciousness or the sense of selfhood or "the meaning of their lives" emerges.

C. Another conception of religion which I wish to examine is in Ames's *The Psychology of Religious Experience*.² Professor Ames thus defines religion: "The social consciousness in its most intimate and vital phases is identical with religion."³ He defends this position on several grounds. First, the traditional distinction between morality and religion was based upon one or other of several dualisms which today have been entirely retired, such as that of the natural and the supernatural which science destroys, or

¹ *Op. cit.*, pp. III, 112.

² *The Psychology of Religious Experience*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1910.

³ *Op. cit.*, p. 377.

that of the faculties which modern psychology destroys, or even that of the conscious and the subconscious which is also doomed.¹ Dr. Ames concludes: "Without the definite assumption of this dualism the line between morality and religion becomes obscure and tends to vanish completely." Now my contention is that while the distinction, which is basic to my definition, between the human and non-human environment is not a substitute for any of the dualisms referred to, it is a distinction so natural and so important as to be worthy of the prominence I give it and is the real ground of the distinction between religion and morality to which tradition has so tenaciously and instinctively clung.

Dr. Ames's second argument is that as we study morality and religion genetically we find that in their beginnings there is no such clear-cut distinction, and so we may conclude that the distinction is due to our habits of thought and not to the nature of the case. "What have come to be known as the religious observances of primitive peoples were concerned with all the vital interests of the social group. . . . It is difficult and in fact quite impossible to distinguish sharply and finally in primitive life between law, morality, art, and religion."² But granted that religion and morality are not clearly separate in their primitive beginnings; granted further that they are continually interfusing even in the mostly highly developed forms; this is no more than may be said of any motives in human life, for all our interests are inextricably interwoven. Their logical differentiation, however, is of great practical importance for purposes of control and enrichment. My criticism of Professor Ames's treatment is that he fails to note that among the various ritualistic or ceremonial activities of a primitive group which he classes together as religious rites some are obviously referable to interests which lie within the group itself and others to interests which involve the relation of the group to its non-human environment.

As chief occasions of ceremonial rites Dr. Ames gives the following:³ (1) phenomena in nature, such as seedtime and harvest, the opening of the fishing and hunting seasons, etc.; (2) birth,

¹ *The Psychology of Religious Experience*, pp. 286, 290.

² *Ibid.*, p. 336.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 73 ff.

initiation, and marriage; (3) death and burial; (4) war and treatment of strangers. Now it is quite true that the most obvious quality which such varied rites have in common is the emotional enhancement of common vital interests. But I believe they may be separated into two classes without the least arbitrariness. For instance, the celebration of natural phenomena and that of the dangers and success of war refer respectively to the non-human and the human environment. Again, death and birth, while having obviously a social reference, nevertheless are outstanding examples of the vital dependence of the group upon the forces of nature, whereas initiation and marriage embody interests which fall almost entirely within the boundaries of the group. The double reference of death and birth does not discount the importance of the distinction which I am trying to emphasize. One and the same event may have *both* moral and religious aspects.

Dr. Ames gives as a further defense of the position that morality and religion are practically identical, the fact that "religion in the minds of its best representatives at the present time consciously and frankly accepts as its highest conception the ideal of a kingdom or brotherhood of moral agents co-operative for the attainment of further moral ends."¹ But compare this "kingdom" ideal with a non-religious utopia, such as socialism. Granted an equal moral earnestness in both, why is the one consciously religious and the other consciously and avowedly non-religious? The one believes itself to be *en rapport* with an extra-human power with which it is co-operating. The other explicitly depends upon its own efforts, its program limits itself strictly to social human forces. The first is religious because, while profoundly moral, it is fundamentally an adjustment to a non-human environing power; the other is moral, and merely moral, because its whole attention and interest centers in the social human situation. To be sure, there are many indications of socialism taking on a religious quality, but these very instances only serve the more clearly to illustrate my thesis. Such religious brands of socialism are those in which the thinker's horizon broadens to take in "nature" or "evolution" or some other more or less

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 286.

inclusive non-human prospect, with which his moral ideals make some sort of adjustment.¹

Again, from the results of Starbuck's investigation, Dr. Ames quotes the fact that "among the things absolutely essential, the *sine qua non* of religion, conduct was most frequently mentioned."² Here again the connection between moral conduct and religion should be obvious. In the higher phases of experience "social attitudes," because organized and voluntary and not merely instinctive and accidental, are moral attitudes. The organism making the religious adjustment is a moral organism, it can give no account of itself without employing ethical categories. A religious experience that has not conduct or moral behavior as an integral part of itself is not from this standpoint thinkable.

It seems to me that the logic of Dr. Ames's position leads to untenable conclusions. The enthusiasm of a political campaign and that of a missionary mass meeting may have very much in common, yet there is surely some deep disparity. A torchlight procession is not necessarily a religious ceremony, nor is the final game in a baseball world-series, though it seems to me that if we adopted Dr. Ames's criterion of the religious quality we should be forced to consider them as such. Take the statement that "all moral ideals are religious in the degree to which they are the expression of great vital interests of society."³ Reform of the currency and tariff revision are great vital interests of society, but no intensity of discussion can make these really religious problems. The high cost of living is a moral or economic and not a religious problem today, whereas the food supply was among primitive men the very impetus to religion; and the reason is that we are concerned with human manipulations of the food supply or with the sources of food in a mechanical or scientific manner, so the problem is partly moral and partly scientific. We are not forced normally to take a social attitude toward the source of the food supply itself, though a great famine would

¹ For instance, one cannot but feel the religious tone of the chapter on "The Good Will" in H. G. Wells's *New Worlds for Old*.

² *Op. cit.*, p. 287.

³ *The Psychology of Religious Experience*, p. 286.

probably inspire in a large part of the population a strictly social attitude toward nature, and many would be likely to pray for rain. I believe we may conclude that it is not merely the greatness of the social interests which are at stake, but the attitude which we take toward the non-human environment with which those interests so closely bind us that determines the religiousness of our ideals. If that attitude is social, and in so far as it is social, we are religious.

Furthermore, if the "social consciousness in its most intimate and vital phases is identical with religion," would it not seem that an intensely individualistic religious experience is a contradiction in terms? Of course, there can be no hard-and-fast distinction between the individual consciousness and the social consciousness, yet there can be no such thing as personality without the distinction. But if the primitive man is religious in proportion as his individuality is lost and swallowed up in the group consciousness as it is in these great ceremonial experiences, and if this is indeed the logic of religion, how can we possibly account for the religious experience that is profoundly antipathetic to the dominant group consciousness and is relatively of an extremely individualistic type? Is not the religious genius, on these grounds, an anomaly? "The most important feature of these ceremonials, that which distinguishes them and makes them religious, is the public and social character. . . . The social side is dominant and controlling. . . . It would be no exaggeration to say that all ceremonials in which the whole group operates with keen emotional interest are religious."¹ To be sure, it is a long way from the dance of a tribe of Australian blacks to the meditations of a highly educated white; but it is the logic of the situation we are concerned with, and if it is the social emotional quality which is the religious differentia, how can individualism be religious? But if the conception of religion be adopted which I have suggested in this paper, is not the religious genius logically normal? It is just the dominant self which emerges in the social *milieu* which is apt, when confronting the non-human environment, to react more forcefully, with personal variation, toward it and so to initiate changes in the reactions of

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 72.

the whole group toward the non-human. So also may be explained, and indeed defended, the insistence which the evangelical Protestant tradition has always maintained, that religion is, in the last analysis, a personal affair.

James in his *The Varieties of Religious Experience* bases his study of religion not upon rites, cult, or institutions, but upon the subjective or individualistic side of religious experience; not upon the primitive, but upon the modern type of man. He holds that "personal religion should still seem the primordial thing."¹ He draws his conclusions from a study of "the feelings, acts, and experiences of individual men in their solitude so far as they apprehend themselves to stand in relation to whatever they may consider the divine."² His conclusion is that "religion is a man's total reaction upon life."³ And by total reaction he means this: "Total reactions . . . to get at them you must go behind the foreground of existence and reach down to that curious sense of the whole residual cosmos as an everlasting presence, intimate or alien, terrible or amusing, lovable or odious, which in some degree everyone possesses."⁴ Now to find the whole residual cosmos, a "presence" "intimate or alien," "lovable or odious"—certainly this is to take a social attitude to the non-human environment. But within the limits of this definition we may find "the light irony of Voltaire and Renan, the pessimism of Schopenhauer or Nietzsche," and James admits that these are logically religious, though there seems some incongruity in calling them such. "For common men religion . . . signifies always a serious state of mind"; and pessimists lack "the purgatorial note which religious sadness gives forth." Now these exceptions are quite in keeping logically with the definition I have suggested. Religion is a vital adjustment, and the more successful and satisfactory it is the more truly may it be called religious. As James says, "the boundaries are always misty and it is everywhere a question of amount and degree."⁵ James feels that religion must have warmth and positiveness:

Morality pure and simple accepts the law of the whole which it finds reigning, so far as to acknowledge and obey it, but it may obey it with the

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 30.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 35.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 37.

² *Ibid.*, p. 31.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 35.

heaviest and coldest heart and never cease to feel it as a yoke. But for religion in its strong and fully developed manifestations, the service of the highest is never felt as a yoke. Dull submission is left far behind and a mood of welcome . . . has taken its place.¹

Here again I submit it is not really a question of morality and religion, but of a more or less successful and complete adjustment on the part of a moral organism to an inescapable non-human environment. To "accept the universe in the drab discolored way of stoic resignation to necessity" is to indicate that the self is baffled or frustated in its effort at adjustment. James admits that morality in this sense and the more successful buoyant type of experience are "both religious in the wider sense."

What of the value of the definition which I have proposed? If it is a "concrete universal," it should serve as a guide to further experience. It should clarify the conditions of any real progress. I believe that it simplifies our religious problem in the following ways:

1. It suggests for the individual the inevitable necessity of some sort of religious experience. The self can never free itself from its encompassing cosmos. For the development of morality enhances the vividness of self-consciousness, and the expansion of science only shifts, never annihilates, the "borderland dim" where "control" merges into mystery.

2. It reveals the underlying harmony of effort in the most divergent religious views and practices. The most primitive savage and the most profound savant are forced to attempt one and the same task, namely, an adjustment of the "self" to the non-human environment. This should change the war of creeds into a co-operative comparison of the relative efficiency of various instruments wherewith the common task is undertaken.

3. It removes the "bottomless subjectivity" which contemporary psychology appears to bring into the religious sphere. For any object of faith is seen in this light to be, not merely the "symbol" of some "value" (which "value" largely evaporates when once its symbol is recognized as mere symbol), but rather an instrument whereby an abiding environment is interpreted or

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 41.

appropriated or controlled. The reality of this environment abides, and the necessary task of adjustment abides. Though the instrument be outworn, even though it be the greatest of all which the past has fashioned, all the validity formerly felt to inhere in that instrument still remains in the vast and vital task for which that tool was forged and in which it was so long and so well used. The conditions of the task are greatly changed. The task in its ultimate simplicity and necessity remains.

4. It reveals the relation between science and religion. This cannot possibly be anything but some sort of supplementation. The social and the non-social attitudes toward the non-human are not contradictory. Physical, mechanical manipulation and control of the environment only serve to enlarge that environment, and beyond the scope of achieved mechanical control forever reaches the realm of the larger organic attitude, the social attitude. In science meanings are abstracted from departments of experience for the sake of more adequate control, and this control serves in turn to produce richer meanings. A mechanical interpretation of Nature is not an end in itself. It is but a means of solving problems, and problems solved make for fuller and richer experience.

It has been the purpose of this essay to indicate the underlying organic relation between the scientific mood and the religious mood. It is not merely that they are alternating tempers, both compelling in their respective ways. They are not merely different. *Why* are they different? *Why* do they alternate? *Why must* they alternate? And what is gained by their alternation? And what is their respective value to the vitality of the human spirit? What are their relative functions in the organism which they both serve? On such questions as these it is hoped the succeeding chapters may throw some light.

CHAPTER III

THE PROBLEM OF RELIGION

Common sense and science present a vast mass of facts, of brute actualities. In the light of common day this world of our multifarious experience is not at all "divine," just a world of men and things. But in the past many sensitive souls have found in this everyday world the tokens of a divine presence; in the stirring struggles for human rights they have conceived the conviction that "the voice of the people is the voice of God"; in studying the stars with all the machinery of mathematics and telescopes they have had to exclaim at last, "O God, I am reading thy thoughts after thee!" But those were less critical days, we think; men were then less conscious of the psychology of their own emotional reactions; is it possible for us to look squarely and steadily into this world of fact and discern in it God? In other words, for the empiricist the question of the existence of God is the question whether there is any intellectually honest way of accepting the emotional reactions of our whole nature at anything like their face value if we find that the envisaged world of fact has *some* aspect which, in *some* of our moods, elicits from deep within us the religious response. For that, from many thoughtful people, in spite of all the concessions which must be made to the scientific or mechanistic interpretation of nature, the world does irresistibly elicit such religious response is unquestionably true.

This is not the first time that men have faced their world, denuded of meanings put upon it by religious tradition, and have tried to give an unbiased answer to the question of what, all in all, they find this world to be. Doubtless, therefore, it would be a salutary thing to review the outstanding examples, in previous times, of the very same sort of empirical¹ investigation which this

¹ Empirical is of course always a relative term. Though Descartes, for instance, was a "rationalist," he was empirically minded as compared with the Schoolmen. By "empirical" then I mean the open-minded investigative attitude rather than the traditionalist. To investigate without *any* assumptions is obviously impossible.

crucial problem of religion forces upon us today. Not that we should be primarily interested in their results, so far as content goes, but it may well be that the very orientation of the task upon a broad and simple historical background will save us useless repetition of fruitless efforts and perchance point the direction in which the problem as a whole seems to tend. In the review which follows, of the way in which this primary problem of religion has presented itself to the empirical mind, I shall try to illustrate rather than demonstrate, and must trust that the statements I make dogmatically may commend themselves as interpretations which the generally accepted facts of the history of philosophy will easily bear. I do not claim to have discovered any novel facts, but only to have seen the old facts, after some little effort to see them in a broad and vital way, in a perspective that may clothe them with a new interest. If I can show a certain rhythm and a certain simplicity in the way thought has moved back and forth upon a rather definite pathway, it is not because I have begun with any Hegelian presuppositions, any assumptions as to the way in which reflection ought to move. Far from it. My sole desire has been to read the history of philosophy as one interested primarily in the psychology of the great movements, not in their minute details, but in their broad outlines. If the reader is suspicious of the simplicity of the parallels which I point out, I can only say that it is a simplicity that, so far as I am aware, I have discovered and not previously assumed.

To state the whole matter very briefly, I wish to trace in sharp and simple outlines the history of what I shall call the *mechanistic-mystical dilemma*. And by mysticism, in this connection, I mean a particular kind of mysticism, what perhaps I might name *classical mysticism* or *nature mysticism*. Let me proceed first of all to make the meaning of this term clear.

I have already defined religion as *a social attitude toward the non-human environment*. This definition was meant to include both nature religion and supra-nature religion. In the latter, where the religious environment is a more or less definitely conceived divine society, the social attitude toward this environment is psychologically simple. But in the case of nature religion the

maintenance of a social attitude toward the non-human environment is not simple, for the spontaneous social responses of the human agent are continually checked and in a way frustrated by the fact that this same nature appears under other circumstances as anything but a *socius*. The emotional social attitudes are continually dogged by sophistication, and instinctive or spontaneous responses are pushed into personifications and sublimations of the original experience, wherein imaginative thought may roam unhampered by continuous reference to facts, or into abstractions, in which reflection seeks some sort of reconciliation between the physical and the quasi-personal complexion which the world of fact seems to bear. The easier thing to do, the popular thing, is to allow the imagination to transfer the social qualities of the world to some supramundane or extra-natural sphere. This, of course, has been accomplished in a very complete way only by the great religions, the gods of primitive peoples lingering in a dim borderland not far removed from the actual physical environment. But in those circumstances where a naïve imagination is checked by a critical intelligence, the mind is forced to maintain toward nature an attitude to some degree social. This attitude I shall call mysticism in the special sense referred to. It is, as I said above, continually checked and modified by the facts of unemotional experience, and thus two tendencies, two typical interpretations of the world, two mutually opposed and radically inconsistent sorts of response to nature, are found in a continually shifting balance. This is what I mean by the *mechanistic-mystical dilemma*.

It is important that "mysticism," as used in this essay, should always be clearly understood as having the meaning specified above. Mysticism in this sense is particularly characteristic of the great reconstructive periods of thought. In all such situations, when the empirically minded religionist is thrown back upon the world of fact, it is the unavoidable expression of the religious disposition. There is, of course, another type of mysticism, the mysticism of the contemplative monk, the mysticism which is directed, not toward nature, but toward the supernatural, toward the divine beings of the "other" world. This is the mysticism of Thomas à Kempis. It is the mysticism of Christian orthodoxy. The first type, with

which alone I shall deal in this essay, is the mysticism of Eckhart and Boehme. Its search is for the living or divine element in the natural world, whereas the other is a search for a more immediate experience of the divine reality of the supernatural or "other" world. While, of course, the two types will tend sometimes to fuse in the experience of individuals, they are logically distinct and will be regarded as such in this discussion.

The history of this mechanistic-mystical dilemma may for the purpose of this essay be divided into three main periods:

- I. From Thales to Aristotle
- II. From Bruno to Leibniz
- III. From Rousseau to Bergson

There are several outstanding characteristics which these three periods have in common. Each one is ushered in by a period of disintegration. In the first case there is the discrediting of Olympianism; in the second, that of ecclesiastical supernaturalism; in the third, that of rationalism. Each is at first marked by an earlier stage of uncritical mysticism, and by a later stage of more critical mysticism, in which a special effort is made to reconcile the mechanistic and the mystical elements. The uncritical mysticism of the first period is the hylozoism of the Ionians; of the second, the "cosmical poetry" of Bruno and Boehme; of the third, the feeling-philosophy of Rousseau. The critical mysticism of the first period is the teleology of Aristotle; of the second, the monadology of Leibniz; of the third, the "creative evolution" of Bergson. In each period, urging thought on toward the final effort of critical mysticism, there are two phases of great importance, (1) an extreme formulation of the mechanistic tendency and (2) a characteristic dualism, the mechanistic and the mystical tendencies threatening to become entirely irreconcilable. The former of these, in the first period, is the atomism of Democritus; in the second, the Galilean mechanics; in the third, the "natural selection" theory of Darwinism. The latter, in the first period, is Platonism; in the second, Cartesianism; in the third, Kantianism.

On the other hand, the three periods are significantly different in this, that whereas the dilemma of the first period is quite objective, in the second it is most characteristically objective-subjective,

in the third subjective. In other words, if we compare the uncritical mysticism of the three periods, we see that in hylozoism the contrast and the attempted union are between the world-stuff and the world-life, both quite objectively conceived; that in the case of Bruno or Boehme the two elements whose contrast is emphasized while their fusion is attempted are the macrocosm and microcosm, nature and man; that in the case of Rousseau the contrast-fusion is between the inner and the outer, the true nature and the tangible form of human experience. This difference between the three periods is still more obvious if we compare the critical mysticisms: the contrast-fusion of Aristotle's system is matter-form; of Leibniz, the lower monads (physical) and the higher monads (spirit, mind); of Bergson, intelligence and intuition. The effort of each of these is, of course, to emphasize and explain the fusion, reducing the contrast to the level of mere appearance, of superficiality. It is, however, in the dualisms of the three periods that this point is most clearly to be seen, the point, namely, that the dilemma is in the first objective, in the second objective-subjective, in the third subjective. In Plato the gulf yawns between concrete thing or act and eternal type; in Descartes, between *res extensa* and *res cogitans*; in Kant, between pure reason and practical reason. The importance of this sequence, objective, objective-subjective, subjective, I shall refer to later in my discussion.

I. THE FIRST PERIOD: FROM THALES TO ARISTOTLE

1. *From Olympianism to hylozoism.*—I have suggested above the psychological principle which goes farthest to explain the rise of hylozoistic philosophy in Ionia. The historical facts which brought this principle into action were, very briefly, these: (a) The Olympian religion had, because of general prosperity and changed conditions of life, got out of touch with practical interests. Originally nature deities, the gods had, through a long, imaginative process, been elevated to the remote grandeur of Olympus. Furthermore, the ethical conceptions of the thoughtful had radically outgrown the moral standards imbedded in the Olympian theology. Olympianism had simply become irrelevant to practical life. (b) All the stimulations of intellectual curiosity and

of a practical interest in the processes of nature which influenced the Ionians of the sixth century, such as the contact with other civilizations and the many novel experiences of the colonists, drove thought back upon the world of fact, a world denuded by the development and the resultant irrelevance of Olympianism of its original (animistic) religious significance.

The result, psychologically, was inevitable. Many aspects of this world, now contemplated with some considerable degree of religiously unprejudiced curiosity, immediately elicited an interpretation of the social type. "All things," said Thales, "are full of gods," by which he meant that the world of the senses was somehow "divine," in some sense alive, however dead the gods of Olympus might be. And the mysterious power of the magnet was a suggestive illustration.¹ Many other aspects of the world, however, elicited, as in all everyday life, only the non-social, the mechanical, adjustments, the physical interpretation. And the Ionian thinker tried to conceive this world, physical yet somehow alive, in terms adequate to both aspects at once, without recourse to mythology. This mechanistic-mystical attitude is hylozoism.

2. *The dualistic tendency of the dilemma.*—But in hylozoism the strain upon the hyphen is great. Greek speculation at once, quite unconsciously, broke the problem up into that of the world-stuff and that of the world-process. Later, when metaphysics grew up afresh out of the soil of ethics, the dualism was first practical, the Socratic contrast between action and goal; then later the logical distinction between particular and universal; then finally the metaphysical distinction between concrete-temporal and the ideal-eternal, the content and the form, the material and the immaterial. Even as the social dispositions of primitive men had instinctively separated a living something from out the matrix of common experience, the living something expressed in "manaism" or what not, only that finally it should be domiciled as the gods upon Olympus; so again the social disposition of the Athenian intellectual separated out the moral goal from the matrix of every-

¹ The reader can easily get at the psychology of the hylozoists by playing for a few minutes with a good strong magnet, allowing himself to feel vividly the kinaesthetic sensations as the magnet pulls upon the bit of steel held between the fingers, and by giving just a little rein to the imagination.

day actions, only to see it finally, via logic and metaphysics, settled as the Idea of the Good, in the heaven beyond the heavens, while the earth and the things that are earthy "participate," inexplicably enough, in the reality of which they are but shadows!

3. *The mechanistic tendency.*—The non-mystical temperament of the Greeks set the pace for all generations. A brief and simple outline of the conceptions which they formulated, in the attempt to understand the world of fact, will perhaps prove suggestive.

The greatest progress toward simplifying and so understanding nature was achieved, through many modifications, by the treatment of substance. (a) The beginning was made by Milesianism, the quest for the one stuff of which the many things are formed. In Thales and Anaximenes this is an empirical substance. In Anaximander it is conceived of as a transempirical substance. (b) The problem of substance soon is seen to be the problem of qualities. The riot of changing and mingling qualities is vastly simplified when Empedocles and Anaxagoras conceive of qualitatively distinct and changeless elements, whose mixture produces our sensuous world. (c) The greatest step was that of atomism, whereby qualitative differences are understood in terms of quantitative differences. There are no real changes in the elements. There are no qualitative differences, save those of size and shape. Combination, due to whirling motions and resultant vortices, accounts for all objects and events, while effluxes, due also to the motions, account for sense-impressions and thoughts. This is the acme of the Greek mechanization of nature.

The treatment of the world-process was more difficult. After the first great step is made of conceiving all changes as merely parts of a world-change, three questions concerning this all-inclusive process inevitably present themselves, namely, What? Why? How?

To the first question there are several answers:

- a) Anaximander: Separation of opposites.
- b) Anaximenes: Condensation and rarefaction.
- c) Empedocles and Anaxagoras: Mixing of qualitatively simple elements.

d) Democritus: Mere motion of non-qualitative elements. Thus far the net result of the simplifying efforts is twofold: the

world is basically merely quantitative; all change is basically motion.

To the second question, *Why?* a mechanistic answer seems impossible. It is a distinctly anthropopathic question. And so we find such conceptions as the generalization of Anaximander that the world-process is injustice requiring compensatory reaction, and that of Heraclitus that the world-strife is justice. But the thoroughgoing mechanist will attempt to make the question *Why?* meaningless when asked concerning the nature-process, by showing its meaninglessness when asked concerning human actions. Democritus' psychology is a theory of atoms-in-motion. But if the atomistic mind still persists in asking *Why?* concerning the vortices of which it is itself but a sample, the answer is Necessity, mathematical necessity.

How? is, as it were, midway between *What?* and *Why?* It seeks a more inward interpretation than *What?* It is less anthropopathic than *Why?* It is the question which becomes crucial only when, after the problem of substance and the problem of process have each received definitive answers, the problem of the relation between substance and process becomes dominant.

It should be noted that while Democritus in Abdera was content to discuss the *What?* of the world-substance and world-process, events in Athens had produced a shift of the philosophic center of gravity, and Socrates had initiated the search for the norm of action and of ethical judgment. As a result the whole metaphysical horizon is tinged with the problem of the normative; the substance-process enigma passes through the alembic of ethical experience and comes out as the content-form enigma. (The means by which the ethical problem is transformed into a metaphysical problem is the logical discussion of the relation between the particular and the universal.) Thus the *How?* of the world-process is a profounder question than the *What?* or the *Why?* inasmuch as the motive of the scientific development from Thales to Democritus is now imbued with the moral earnestness engendered in Socrates and Plato by the tragic social situation in Athenian life. It is deeper, also, because of the influence of mathematical insight, and because of the new rigor imposed upon thought by the development of logic.

This greater profundity may be most clearly seen by noting a relation which, though perhaps not due to a direct connection, is yet actually existent between the Platonic-Aristotelian statement of the world-problem and the Democritean solution. Democritus succeeded in stripping the elemental substance, the atom, of all qualities save form. For Aristotle the substance and the form are separable in thought. Indeed there seemed no way of allowing form to adhere inseparably to substance without being driven to atomistic materialism. So much at least the preceding three centuries had demonstrated. On the other hand, if separable, how could form and substance be conceived of as being actually related? Plato's failure to answer this question is notorious. The doctrine of participation was not satisfactory. The situation is relieved by recourse to mythology. The notion of the demiurge and of the world-soul is anthropopathism revived. If for Plato the world was "fundamentally mathematical," it was nevertheless ultimately not intelligible as such. Without the demiurge and the world-soul the mathematical world cannot be understood. Thus Plato was "in some things a reactionary."¹ Only, according to the thesis of this paper, being "reactionary" was simply being a mystic. Mechanism reacts inevitably against mysticism, and mysticism reacts as inevitably against mechanism. The lion and the lamb do not for long lie down together.

This, then, is the How-problem of the world-process in the peculiarly difficult form in which it presented itself to Aristotle. How does matter take on form? How does the essence realize itself in the concrete particular reality? The doctrine of development is Aristotle's answer to the What-problem. But within this notion there lurks the subtler question of *how* the development takes place.

4. *Critical mysticism*.—The teleology which Plato had suggested in figurative or mythical form Aristotle embodied in his doctrine of entelechy, the thought that cosmic processes are the realization of the essence in the phenomenon. The cue for this system was the development of growing organisms and the constructive activities of man. It is evident, however, that the teleology of growth and that of artistic construction are not at all the same, and since

¹ Marvin, *History of European Philosophy*, p. 147.

these two applications of the teleological principle run through the whole system sometimes quite confused, we have here, in the use of the latter at least, a further illustration of my thesis that the Greek mind was continually forced back upon anthropopathic or social conceptions to eke out its otherwise abstract and mechanical interpretations of reality. Although it is true that the application of this artistic principle is mostly by way of analogy, nevertheless it is just this inability of the greatest mind of the ancient period to dispense entirely with the personal or quasi-personal feeling in his explanation of cosmic processes that is so significant.

It is illuminating to note the several ways in which Aristotle seeks on the one hand to save his teleology from becoming a merely anthropopathic teleology, and on the other to preserve any real significance for the human comprehension of it. In the first place, vitalistic finalism and artistic finalism offset each other, the former getting its actual intelligibility by means of the artistic or constructive analogy, the latter being corrected in its inherent anthropopathic tendency by constant reference to the biological process. In the second place, the artistic finalism is broken up into four elements, namely, material cause, efficient cause, formal cause, and final cause. The last of these is shown to be the most important. Formal cause and efficient cause would inevitably tend toward anthropopathism, if indeed not toward anthropomorphism. Hence this danger is averted by stressing final cause. Again, the artistic analogy is rendered innocuous by the entelechial psychology, wherein, even as vegetative soul and animal soul are progressively *aufgehoben* in the rational soul, so the rational soul, which would be responsible for the existence of final cause (in the artistic analogy), is in turn *aufgehoben* by the cosmic progression toward pure form. And then, in the fourth place, by the subtle correlation of form and matter, the one being drawn on by the attraction of form, the other being effectively attractive only because of the longing of matter for form, by this subtle correlation the pure passivity of the perfection of God is yet dynamic, while the "longing" of matter is yet not a merely hylozoistic longing.

Thus does the subtle anthropoteism of the culminating system of antiquity save itself from a cruder anthropopathism. But

thus, also, does the mystical motif vindicate itself as an inevitable supplementation of the mechanistic motif. From first to last the systems of antiquity illustrate this point that the mechanical and mystical interpretations of the world are complementary and at the same time mutually contradictory. Each tends to force the other from the field, yet each in itself is inadequate. The various conceptions which seek to combine the two are always in unstable equilibrium. They tend to break down either in one direction or in the other.

II. THE SECOND PERIOD: FROM BRUNO TO LEIBNIZ

1. *From ecclesiastical supernaturalism to Bruno's philosophy.*—It should be obvious that when the metaphysical dualism, beginning in the system of Plato, culminated in the system of Christianity, by which reality falls apart into two utterly distinct spheres, the temporal and the eternal, the sensuous and the supramundane, thought should find much less difficulty in apprehending it in the opposed categories of the mechanical and mystical attitudes. The problem is not now that of interpreting a world that seems inadequately explained by either mechanical or mystical concepts exclusively, but of explaining the possibility and method of contact between the two worlds which are regarded as metaphysically distinct. For the practical needs of Christianity this problem is readily enough solved by the conception of revelation and miracle, and in an age that was hard pressed by practical religious and moral rather than philosophical needs the mystical attitude attached itself inevitably to the supramundane, divine world and the mechanical to the earthly, temporal world. Consequently the patristic and mediaeval periods are comparatively poor in illustrations of the thesis I am advancing. But when once the movement which began with Duns Scotus at the culmination of mediaeval thought, namely, the separation of philosophy from theology, reached its consummation, and the thinker was free to look again with untrammelled curiosity at the world about him and to seek expressions for the responses that it evoked within him, this antagonism and necessary mutual supplementation of mechanical and mystical interpretations which I have noted in the Greek period become again remarkably apparent.

The psychology of this return to the world of fact from a pre-occupation with a world of faith is hardly less simple than that of the Ionians. The growing irrelevance of the established view of life, a quickening of the intellect by great discoveries, the discovery of classical culture, of a wide, wide world, of a solar system—all this is a familiar story. And thrown back upon this world of fact, aided by the recently discovered neo-Platonic and neo-Pythagorean philosophies, Bruno and Boehme at once reacted mystically to this great world of fact. The transcendency of God is not so much denied as ignored. It is the immanence of God with which the natural philosophy of the Renaissance is concerned. The essence of God and that of the world are identified. He is the "inexhaustible infinite world-force; the *natura naturans* which in eternal change forms and 'unfolds' itself purposefully and in conformity with law into the *natura naturata*."¹ While the cosmology of Bruno bears a striking resemblance to that of Democritus and Epicurus, "a system of countless worlds, each of which . . . grows from chaotic conditions to clear and definite formation and again yields to the destiny of dissolution," yet Bruno "regarded the plurality of solar systems not as a mechanical juxtaposition, but as an organic living whole, and regarded the process of the growth and decay of worlds as maintained by *the pulse-beat of the one divine all-life*."²

2. *The dualistic tendency.*—It is obvious enough that in Bruno's *natura naturans* and *natura naturata* the passive and active participles indicate a counterpart of the two aspects of the *hylozoism* of the Ionians. But the dilemma is now not so characteristically objective as it is objective-subjective. This is suggested by the importance of the conception of macrocosm and microcosm, which played so important a part in the philosophy of the Renaissance, and makes self-realization the key to the riddles of the universe. The self-consciousness of this period is one thing that makes it profoundly different from the classic period.

This aspect of the situation becomes clearly dominant in the work of Descartes, whose *cogito* is the starting-point of his philosophy, and whose division of reality into *res cogitans* and *res extensa*

¹ Windelband, *History of Philosophy*, p. 367.

² Italics are mine.

is the subjective-objective counterpart of the substance-process, or matter-form, dualism of the Greeks. (The latter produced a brood of ontological perplexities and puzzles, taxing to the limit the brain of an Aristotle; the former has produced a still greater horde of puzzles, the problems and perplexities of epistemology. No doubt men will at last learn that the only way to answer the problems created by a dualism, whether ontological or epistemological, is to find the origin of the dualism and understand the conditions which produced it. Otherwise we are treating symptoms and not causes.)

In a word, the significance of Descartes' *res cogitans* for our present discussion is simply this: It provided an asylum for all those emotional and quasi-ethical values which the new science had just banished from the 'objective world. Mechanics had reduced the world to a mechanism, robbed of those vague quasi-personal qualities which it has always had except when, as I have said, they had been banished, by Olympianism, Platonism, or Christianity, to some "other" world. Cartesianism finds also an "other" world for them, but it is now not a supramundane world, but the world of man's inner experience, his subjective being. So it is that Descartes' dualism seems at first to afford relief from the mechanizing of the objective world.

3. *The mechanistic development.*—

a) In the objective sphere: Probably the most stimulating thing in nature is movement. The evolution of humanity has, physiologically considered, depended predominantly upon the development of the distant receptors, ears and eyes, especially eyes, whose function it is, in large part, to notify the organism of movement in its environment. Even in civilized man the vague perception of something moving, caught by the tail of the eye, often can stir the whole organism more violently than the most gorgeous panorama of motionless landscape or the most splendid prospect of massed stone and brick. An unexpected movement in some supposedly inanimate object can, in spite of us, banish, momentarily at least, our deepest sophistication. The human organism can soon make itself master of motionless objects. Movement is the incalculable element of our experience, in response to

which our instinctive and emotional nature is always ready to assert itself. It was, then, to put it mildly, an epoch-making event when man learned to apply the laws of the motionless to motion. That was, in a word, the inestimable feat of Galileo. He "created mechanics as the mathematical theory of motion." This achievement was pregnant with incalculable changes in man's attitude toward the forces of the world. Arithmetic and geometry had been long in preparation, but had been applicable, in any successful way, only to motionless objects, as motionless. When Kepler established the principle that all changes in the universe are to be considered primarily as motion, and Galileo immediately found how to apply to motion the principles of the motionless, the foundation was laid for that wonderful development known as modern science, the secret of which is, so far as our present discussion is concerned, the substitution of effective, non-emotional, mechanistic, purely intellectual conceptions and manipulations of natural objects and forces, for the spontaneous but ineffective, emotional, instinctive, anthropopathic attitudes.

b) In the subjective sphere: The inspiring success of the new mechanics and the need of a more exact science of social experience made it inevitable that the application of the same mechanical method should be attempted with reference to the subjective realm. Hobbes is the great innovator in this departure; if emotion is simply a kind of motion, a mechanics of morality would seem feasible enough. Locke's sensationalism, the "association" psychology and the whole rationalistic development in its application to mental and spiritual experience, is the result of this ambition to work out a mechanics of inner experience.

4. *Critical mysticism*.—The significance of Leibniz in this period is similar to that of Aristotle in the first. To the intellect a dualism between *res extensa* and *res cogitans* is as unsatisfactory as that between matter and form; and to the spiritual interests of man an extreme and unmodified mechanistic view of life, whether objective or subjective, is even more unacceptable. The chief motive in the work of Leibniz was the desire to reduce this dualism and to restore the meaning, the purposefulness, of the world, which mechanism seemed to have destroyed.

The reconciliation of the mechanical and teleological views of the world was the leading motive in the thought of Leibniz. He wished to get the mechanical explanation of nature carried through to its fullest extent, and at the same time he cast about for thoughts by the aid of which the purposeful living character of the universe might nevertheless remain comprehensible. The attempt must therefore be made to see whether the whole mechanical course of events could not be ultimately traced back to efficient causes, whose purposeful nature should afford an import and meaning to their working taken as a whole. The ultimate goal of this philosophy is to understand the mechanism of the cosmic processes as the means and phenomenal form by which the living content or import of the world realizes itself.¹

How then does Leibniz reconcile mechanism and mysticism? In other words, how, in the first place, does he modify mechanism so as to relieve it of its cold and cheerless purposelessness, and how, in the second place, does he guard mysticism against its inherent tendency toward crude anthropopathism? Space forbids anything more than a compact and dogmatic statement.

In the first place, let us recall the net result of the achievements in the mechanistic tendency up to this time. Democritus had completed the Greek mechanization of substance by reducing all qualitative differences to purely quantitative differences, as in the doctrine of the atom, and had also reduced all changes to motion. But motion remains as an unexplained datum, inseparably connected with substance, for the atoms are eternally in motion. In the second period the Galilean mechanics has logically eliminated motion (the path of a cannon ball, for instance, being definable in a mathematical formula, consisting of "variables," which variables, when assigned any particular values, give, as their actual meaning, a point, a motionless point, in two- or three-dimensional space); so that, in the objective sphere, Descartes finds only *res extensa*, or substance whose nature is extension. Now Leibniz meets this entire situation by a startling innovation, which has linked his fame with modern physical theory. This innovation is the denial that the ultimate nature of substance is extension, and the affirmation that it is force. There is nothing, he claims, in extension which can explain force or motion, but force can explain both extension and motion. The method by which he arrived at

¹ Windelband, *op. cit.*, p. 421.

this conclusion was in part an examination of the problem of inertia,¹ and in part (and this is no less significant, as recalling the subjective-objective point of view of this whole humanistic period) by an analysis of the logical judgment, the discovery that a true substance is "that which is the subject of all the various predicates, but is itself the predicate of no subject," and the assumption that the self is the only subject which meets this condition, and is therefore the type of true substance. "The essential feature of substance, as represented by the Ego, is its self-originating and self-determining nature. This dynamical quality . . . [is] an *entelechy* . . . 'a sufficiency which makes it the source of its internal activities.'"² This force, further, which is the ultimate nature of all substance, of every "monad," is *appétition*, a striving to fulfil its own potency by a progressively clear *représentation* of the nature of the whole universe.

On the surface this would seem to be mysticism with a vengeance. The whole previous development seems quite reversed, for whereas Democritus, Galileo, and Descartes have reduced all objective reality to extension, Leibniz pushes it all onto the other horn of the dilemma, and reduces everything, bodies and motions alike, to *appétition*, which confessedly is akin, at least in its higher manifestations, to desire. How then does he safeguard his mysticism from becoming a sort of animistic atomism?

There are three factors in this part of his task: In the first place, all change is restricted to an inherent development within each monad, for it is explicitly denied that the monads influence each other. They "have no windows." What is implicit simply becomes explicit. What is potential becomes actual. Thus real change is, so to speak, denatured. In the second place, there is a pervasive equivocation in the use of the term "representation." The fallacy of figure of speech could be traced in the suggestions of the phrase, "a *living mirror* of the universe."³ Representing means sometimes symbolizing, sometimes perceiving, a curious fusion of the mathematical and the psychological. An algebraic

¹ Cf. Windelband, *op. cit.*, p. 421.

² See Hibben, *The Philosophy of the Enlightenment*, pp. 168, 169.

³ Italics mine. See *Monadology*, secs. 56, 83.

equation represents a circle; the conscious purpose of the supreme monad represents the whole cosmic process. The concepts of the mathematician's consciousness and the mathematical truth of his consciousness are melted into an equivocal notion pregnant with a superficial success for the solution of the dilemma under discussion.¹ In the third place, the doctrine of "pre-established harmony" emerges from this mathematical type of representation. If $4x^2 + 9y^2 = 36$ represents an ellipse and $4x^2 - 9y^2 = 36$ represents a hyperbola, the change from plus to minus sign does not cause the change from ellipse to hyperbola; the two changes simply reveal an inherent and necessary co-ordination. In some such sense is there a "pre-established harmony" between thoughts of the soul and movements of the body, between the divine purpose and the events of history, between the "windowless" development of every monad and that of every other.² Thus real cause, in the dynamic sense, is, in large part, supplanted by cause in the mathematical sense, a "function of variables." In short, the mechanistic world of *res extensa* is replaced by a mystical world of *force-monads*. But this dynamic reality is rendered static, its harmony is pre-established, its "appetition" is congealed into formal logic. To be sure, in the last resort, the whole scheme resolves itself into and solves itself by an appeal to theology. But so did Plato fall back on mythology, making "participation" intelligible by invoking the "demiurge"—the philosophical *deus ex machina*!

To a friend Leibniz writes: "I flatter myself that I have discovered the harmony of the different systems, and have seen that both sides are right, provided they do not clash with one another; that in the phenomena of nature everything happens mechanically, and at the same time metaphysically."³ "Provided they do not clash with one another!" What a *petitio principii*! This age-old puzzle is not solved by a little mathematics, and the philosopher is doomed to tread many more weary rounds. From Aristotle to Leibniz, from Leibniz to Bergson, the problem passes. But in

¹ Compare Windelband's statement in another connection, "Leibniz is here served a very good turn by the ambiguity in the word 'representation,'" *op. cit.*, p. 422, n. 6.

² Compare Hibben, *op. cit.*, pp. 179 ff.

³ *Schriften*, II, 607. Quoted by Hibben, *op. cit.*, p. 185.

the meantime Kant has, by his "Copernican revolution," enabled men to envisage the whole situation in an entirely new way. Perhaps in this third period we shall come nearer to the heart of the trouble in this mechanistic-mystical dilemma.

III. THE THIRD PERIOD: FROM ROUSSEAU TO BERGSON

1. *The reaction from rationalism: Rousseau's philosophy of feeling.*—As the Greeks had reacted from Olympianism and discovered a hylozoistic world, the Renaissance had reacted from supernaturalism and discovered a self-and-nature reality, a humanistic-naturalistic world. But, as before, the strain upon the hyphen steadily increased. The microcosm and macrocosm of Bruno become the *res cogitans* and *res extensa* of Descartes. The simplifying work goes on, and Descartes' *res cogitans* becomes, for Locke, a *tabula rasa*, still further impoverished, "innate ideas" being denied. The Cartesian dualism was not so intolerable, because innate ideas, through the demonstration of the existence of God, provided some sort of connection, by means of "occasionalisms," "pre-established harmonies," etc. But Locke was harder pressed to find the connection between the *tabula rasa* mind and the world. The embarrassment is relieved somewhat by Berkeley's startling innovation, but that is soon overthrown by Hume. There is a chasm now between even the surface and the body of the *tabula*, and the impressions on the once *rasa* surface give absolutely no clue to the existence of the reality for which they seem to stand. Real connections between God and the world, between self and nature, have utterly disappeared. The two partial dichotomies of Descartes have produced an absolutely complete trichotomy. Rationalism and deism have reduced reality to utter barrenness. Such is the result of the progressive impoverishment of the erstwhile meaningful human microcosm by the assiduous application to it of the ideal of mathematics and mechanics.

The great significance of Rousseau is, in a word, his effectual affirmation of the truth that there is much in the human microcosm besides a mathematical intellect. As Descartes had begun by shutting out the "animal spirits" from the confines of the soul

(the real *res cogitans*), Rousseau reversed the whole matter by submerging the mind in the feelings.

To re-enrich the self was inevitably to close up the fatal dualisms of the past two centuries, and before long Herder was showing that the individual and the nation are mystically one, Schelling that the self and nature are mystically one, Schleiermacher that man and God are mystically one, Fichte that moral will and knowledge process are mystically one—in a word, the whole new age is rejoicing in the rediscovered unity of life. It finds its great intellectual statement in Hegel.

2. But in this rich and rapid development the basic difficulties of the mechanistic-mystical dilemma have been somewhat obscured. The passion for unity has outstripped Kant's cautious dualism of the pure reason and the practical reason. The novelty of his "Copernican revolution," his putting of the whole question on the new level of constructive idealism, quite overshadowed the enigma of how the same ego can find both necessity and freedom, irreconcilables as they are, in its experience. The world is mechanical, said Kant, because of the inexorable workings of the pure reason; life is mystical because of the no less inexorable workings of the practical reason; can these two expressions of the ego be reconciled? The *Critique of the Judgment* was an attempt to solve the old dilemma, stated now, not in objective terms, nor in objective-subjective terms, but in the strictly subjective terms of "pure reason" and "practical reason." But whatever force there was in the solution offered in the *Critique of the Judgment* was rendered obsolete on the advent of Darwinism.

3. But advancing science has forced upon religion once more the ancient perplexity. The significance of "natural selection" and "conservation of energy," about the middle of the century, and the whole subsequent development, particularly in psychology, are too obvious to be more than mentioned. In reaction against materialism (mechanism) absolute idealism has been revived, with many modifications and refinements. (Logically, from the standpoint of this paper, absolute idealism belongs to the level of the second period, where the two terms are self and nature, ego and world. During the enlightenment the influence of mechanics

enabled the mechanism of nature to swallow up the self, the laws of the physical world to reduce the ego to an unreality. In absolute idealism the influence of Berkeley and Kant enabled the mystical creativeness of the self to swallow up nature, the laws of the thinking ego to reduce the physical world to an unreality. For rationalism, the world-machine, including the cogs of "association," the levers of "pleasure-and-pain," is all, and, except as a piece of it, of a piece with it, the ego is nothing. For idealism the absolute ego is all, and the world of events and things and men, except as a piece of it, of a piece with it, is nothing, a "mere appearance.") For the rest, the religious spirit has fallen back on Kant's cleavage between the moral nature and the intellect. Such is the logic of the whole Ritschlian movement. We are shown a realm of values and a realm of existences. These are incommensurables; science and religion are mutually immune.

4. But now finally the task of Aristotle in the first, of Leibniz in the second, has been attempted in this third period by Bergson. In a word, he takes up the problem where Kant left it, and with the new concept of evolution strives to show the underlying unity between the intellect, the organ of mechanism, which reveals a world determined at every point, and intuition, the organ of mysticism, which reveals a world of spontaneity and freedom.

Of Bergson's treatment of the problem and of the lesson which the whole story of the problem teaches as to the future method of approach I shall speak in the following chapter.

CHAPTER IV

THE PROBLEM OF RELIGION—*Continued*

Modern philosophy had its roots in a quickened sense of the distinction between the human self and the non-human world in the midst of which its existence is cast. This enhanced self-consciousness of man began to move around two foci of difficulty: on the one hand the freshly stimulated intellect was keenly aware of its privilege of striving to know its environing world at first hand; on the other the new evaluation of human worth, accompanied by diminution of vital interest in the traditional "other" world of ecclesiastical thought, inevitably threw the objective "natural" world into the position of a more or less enigmatical vis-à-vis. Hence developed at once a twofold dualism, that of the knower and the object-of-knowledge, and of the self and the non-human "other." To comprehend the difficulties of the former phase of this dualism has been the task of epistemology; to solve those of the latter, the philosophical problem of religion. The two are obviously closely interwoven. Any solution of either one will ultimately have to reckon with the other. The great need is for a philosophy that embraces both problems from a unitary point of view, and works always with an empirical rather than a speculative method.

For an empirical theology, of course, the second of these two dualisms and its various difficulties and proposed solutions is of primary importance. But the moral self, which must face its environing non-human world and discover, for weal or woe, whether that world is "spiritual" or "material," is also a knowing self, and the value of its religious convictions must always depend ultimately on the validity of its cognitional processes.¹ To the primary aspect of this twofold problem the present chapter is devoted; of the other, its indispensable complement, a discussion will be given later.

¹ "Cognitional" is here used in the broadest sense, as including any form of consciousness that seems to grasp reality.

In the preceding chapter I have made an effort to state in brief and simple outlines the way in which what I have called the mechanical-mystical dilemma has presented itself in the course of philosophical reflection. It was pointed out that when serious reflection is thrown back upon nature, on the collapse of some long-standing supranature scheme of things, man always finds some aspects of this non-supernatural environment which elicit from him *social* responses, more vague, less anthropomorphic, to be sure, than the original animism (or "animatism") of primitive religion, but no less truly social in their essential character. Of such social responses to the non-human environment (in other than these social moods called the physical world) the hylozoism of the Ionians was typical, as also the "nature poetry" of Bruno and Boehme. This sort of attitude, instinctive-reflective, I have called mysticism (or classical mysticism to distinguish it clearly from the other type, which is an attitude directed toward the clearly supernatural socii of the divine "other" world). This social sort of attitude toward nature, however, is continually checked and modified by the mechanical habits of thought and action which the events and things of life ordinarily elicit from us. The mystical attitude and the mechanical attitude are thus pitted against each other, neither one being able to force the other completely from the field. Thus through philosophy runs the *mystical-mechanical dilemma*.

It was pointed out, further, that the outstanding efforts to find some resolution of this dilemma have moved upon one or other of three levels. In the first period, that of Greek philosophy, the problem was typically upon an objective level; in the second, from Bruno¹ to Leibniz, subjective-objective, that is, the external physical world is mechanically interpreted, the inner world is felt to be spiritual, that is, it is mystically interpreted, and hence the problem of the relation between the microcosm and the macrocosm, the *res cogitans* and the *res extensa*, the "monad" which is soul

¹ In its beginnings, it is true, this period attributes to the "macrocosm" a quasi-personal quality, under the idea of *natura naturans*, and in so far it remains on the first or objective level. But the subjective-objective dualism is soon clearly formulated by Descartes.

and the "monad" which is (or seems to be) matter. Though Rousseau and the Romantic movement gave a check to the victory which, in rationalism, mechanism seemed to be winning over mysticism, the advent of physiological psychology, in particular, plunged thought into the old dilemma again, and during the last three-quarters of a century the battle has been waged with increasing bitterness, on the question whether the soul or the mind can have, rightfully, any mystical evaluation at all, or whether the human spirit must be seen in the last analysis as only an exceedingly complex mechanism of strictly material forces or elements. Of the tendency to give the inner life this latter purely mechanistic interpretation, Haeckel's philosophy is typical.¹

On the third level, however, the problem is given a distinctly new formulation by Kant. His "Copernican revolution" consists, in a word, in relegating the question of the ultimate nature of reality, as it is apart from human consciousness, to the limbo of the unknowable and in striving instead to understand how it is that the human mind, by virtue of its very constitution, gives to experience the two incompatible aspects of necessity and freedom, and then to discover the underlying unity of this, the mind's twofold activity, which produces these apparent irreconcilables. The explanation of how the mind mechanizes experience is given in the *Critique of the Pure Reason*; of how it mysticizes experience, in the *Critique of the Practical Reason*; of how these two are fundamentally unitary, in the *Critique of the Judgment* (especially the first part, concerning the aesthetic judgment).

It will be helpful to make, for the present, a definite effort to keep this phase of the significance of Kant's innovation distinct from the epistemological questions with which it is so closely connected. So far as the religious problem is concerned the importance of Kant consists simply in this: first, that the mechanical-mystical dilemma becomes primarily a question of how the human mind by virtue of its own operations gives of the same facts both a mechanistic and a mystical interpretation; and that, secondly, the

¹ Haeckel, in reality, only pushes the problem back to the first level, in that he attributes to the material atom a rudimentary sort of feeling or inclination—only one more of the many modifications of hylozoism.

reconciliation of these irreconcilables is seen to be primarily a psychological and not a metaphysical problem. This is the new cue for the discussion of the old problem. In so far as it has been ignored by the nineteenth-century philosophy nothing new has been added to the earlier viewpoints. And for the most part it has been ignored on account of three different directions in which the philosophy of the century has moved.

1. The epistemological difficulties of a *human* idealism at once pushed philosophers on to an *absolute* idealism. Within this "absolute" doctrine the same mechanistic-mystical dilemma asserted itself again, so that, as in the case of rationalism and Rousseau, there was the antagonism of the mathematical-logical ideal and the ethical-emotional ideal, in absolute idealism we find a rationalistic dialectic which tends toward a denial that the absolute is "personal" (e.g., Bradley), and an ethico-mystical tendency which asserts that the absolute is "personal" (e.g., Royce). But obviously any attempt at a reconciliation of these opposing viewpoints must, in the nature of the case, be metaphysical or merely dialectical; and such an undertaking is not in line with the psychological method which Kant undertook (which, it is true, gave place to a logical and metaphysical procedure before his task had been carried very far).

2. The inevitable reaction against idealism carried the problem back at once to the first, the objective, level. Herbart's "reals," for instance, are an attempted amalgamation of the primitive static and the primitive dynamic conceptions—the "reals" are absolutely changeless in themselves, and yet each seeks to "preserve its identity against disturbances on the part of the other reals." The common, unconfessed assumption of all such systems, from Democritus to Haeckel, is that if one can but reduce the non-dynamic (the non-mystical or mechanical) and the dynamic (the mystical) phases of experience each to the lowest conceivable terms, they will somehow fuse in a single type of existence, a simple entity. The success of all such systems depends upon either an elusive fallacy of equivocation, as in the case of Leibnitz' use of the term "representation," or the uncritical acceptance of a hyphenated

atom or monad in place of the rejected enigma of a hyphenated (mechanical-mystical) world.

3. The century has been characterized by heroic efforts to ignore both the religious and the epistemological problems by restricting philosophical attention to the questions of the relation of the self and its human environment. But it is interesting to observe how inevitably these movements are forced to come ultimately face to face with the very extra-human reality from which they tried to withdraw reflection. In this third tendency there are three clearly distinguishable types. (a) Positivism. But note that Comte, in his later days, recognizes the need of religion to supply the social movement with an adequate dynamic, and therefore elaborates his "religion of humanity"; this is a long step toward grounding ethics in an extra-human background, for "humanity" spans the ages and takes on some sort of cosmic significance. Guyau goes farther and describes ethical conduct as a sort of co-operation with the cosmos or with nature. (b) Utilitarianism. But note that Spencer's evolutionism drags the utilitarian ethics irresistibly into the realm of the philosophy of the extra-human by raising the question as to the relation between the law of biological survival and the law of human conduct; through Huxley and Green this issue is pushed on into an idealistic metaphysics. (c) In Germany, Max Stirner and Bahnsen give the non-metaphysical ethics an utterly individualistic tendency, defending a regardlessly solipsistic morality. Deprived thus of even its social anchorage (which it had in those typical French and English movements), the reaction against the philosophical tradition, with its apparently unsolvable religious and epistemological perplexities, finds a frantic culmination in the Nietzschean demand for a "revaluation of all values."

We come back then to the question as to how far Kant's formulation of the mechanical-mystical dilemma has guided philosophy in the last century. In one way his example has had a very great effect, in the practical dualism of existence and value, of intellectual processes and appreciative insight, of scientific method and religious faith, which has played so large a part in recent thought. For example, the whole Ritschlian movement is based on the Kantian

dualism of the "pure reason" and the "practical reason." But this neo-Kantian movement fails to do justice to Kant's concern for the underlying unity of the mind, which, as said above, found expression in his *Critique of the Judgment*.

The philosopher who in recent times has made the greatest effort to orient this problem of the mechanistic-mystical aspects of life on the third level, that of Kantian constructive idealism, and to seek a solution for it from the larger Kantian viewpoint is Bergson. He starts, as Kant did, to make a psychological study of the contradictory testimony which our human consciousness gives as to the nature of reality; his psychology proves inadequate, as Kant's did, and is supplemented by metaphysics; he combines a constructive idealism with dualism and realism, as Kant also did. (And yet, professing a radical empiricism and a thoroughgoing evolutionism, he seems to some to have much in common with the "pragmatism" of William James.) It seems to the present writer that a brief examination of Bergson's philosophy may make a particularly appropriate background against which to suggest the direction in which a strictly psychological, non-metaphysical method of approaching this ancient dilemma must probably proceed.

Let us note, in the first place, how forcibly Bergson states the issue regarding the mechanical and mystical aspects of experience, especially in that realm where the ancient debate has taken on its peculiarly modern intensity, that of the inner life. This is the theme of the first of his three major works, *Essai sur les données immédiates de la conscience*.¹ Note in the first place his discussion of the two conceptions of causality, the mathematical and the dynamic.² These two conceptions are continually striving to replace each other.

Unfortunately the habit has grown up of taking the principle of causality in both senses at the same time. . . . Sometimes we think particularly of the regular *succession* of physical phenomena and of the kind of inner effort by which one *becomes* another; sometimes we fix our mind on the absolute *regu-*

¹ Paris, 1889; English translation by Pogson, *Time and Free Will*. Macmillan, 1910 (3d ed. 1913).

² *Op. cit.*, pp. 204 ff. and 211 ff.

larity of the phenomena, and from the idea of regularity we pass by imperceptible steps to that of mathematical necessity. . . . And we do not see any harm in letting these two conceptions blend into one another and in assigning greater importance to the one or the other *according as we are more or less concerned with the interests of science.*¹

But with the progress of science this quasi-personal notion of causation is more and more excluded in favor of mathematical equivalence.

The sundering of these two ideas is an accomplished fact in the natural sciences. The physicist may speak of forces and even picture their mode of action by analogy with an inner effort, but he will never introduce this hypothesis into a scientific explanation. Even those who, with Faraday, replace the extended atoms by dynamic points will treat the centres of force and the lines of force mathematically, without troubling about force itself considered as an activity or an effort. It then comes to be understood that the relation of external causality is purely mathematical and has no resemblance to the relation between psychical force and the act which springs from it.²

Science cannot deal with time and motion except on condition of first eliminating the essential and qualitative element of time, *duration*, and of motion, *mobility*.³

Nevertheless, we cannot entirely succeed in mathematicizing the natural world. On this pertinacity of the anthropopathic element in our conception of nature, the way in which some not entirely necessary factor seems to remain, our feeling for a residual spontaneity in the natural process, note the following:

We certainly feel, it is true, that although things do not endure as we do ourselves, nevertheless there must be some reason why phenomena are seen to *succeed* one another instead of being set out all at once. And this is why the notion of causality, although it gets indefinitely near that of identity, will never seem to us to coincide with it, unless we conceive clearly the idea of a mathematical mechanism or unless some subtle metaphysic removes our very legitimate scruples on that point.⁴

With regard to the inner life there is the same mechanical-mystical dilemma as in the case of outer fact.

There are finally two different selves, one of which is, as it were, the external projection of the other, its spatial and, so to speak, social representation.

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 216 (last italics mine).

³ *Op. cit.*, p. 115.

² *Op. cit.*, pp. 218-19.

⁴ *Op. cit.*, p. 210.

We reach the former by deep introspection, which leads us to grasp our inner states as living things, constantly becoming, as states not amenable to measure, which permeate one another and of which the succession in duration has nothing in common with juxtaposition in homogeneous space. But the moments at which we thus grasp ourselves are rare, and that is just why we are rarely free. The greater part of the time we live outside ourselves, hardly perceiving anything of ourselves but our own ghost, a colorless shadow which pure duration projects into homogeneous space. Hence our life unfolds in space rather than in time; we live for the external world rather than for ourselves; we speak rather than think; we "are acted" rather than act ourselves. To act freely is to recover possession of oneself, and to get back into pure duration.¹

But, in our view, there is a third course which might be taken, namely, to carry ourselves back in thought to those moments of our life when we made some serious decision, moments unique of their kind, which will never be repeated—any more than the past phases in the history of a nation will ever come back again. We should see that if these past states cannot be adequately expressed in words or artificially reconstructed by a juxtaposition of simpler states, it is because in their dynamic unity and wholly qualitative multiplicity they are phases of our real and concrete duration, a heterogeneous duration and a living one. We should see that, if our action was pronounced by us to be free, it is because the relation of this action to the state from which it issued could not be expressed by a law, this psychic state being unique of its kind and unable ever to occur again. We should see, finally, that the very idea of necessary determination here loses every shred of meaning, that there cannot be any question either of foreseeing the act before it is performed or of reasoning about the possibility of the contrary action once the deed is done, for to have all the conditions given is, in concrete duration, to place oneself at the very moment of the act and not to foresee it. But we should also understand the illusion which makes the one party think that they are compelled to deny freedom, and the others that they must define it. *It is because the transition is made by imperceptible steps from concrete duration, whose elements permeate one another, to symbolical duration, whose moments are set side by side, and consequently from free activity to conscious automatism.* It is because, although we are free whenever we are willing to get back into ourselves, it seldom happens that we are willing. It is because, finally, even in the cases where the action is freely performed, we cannot reason about it without setting out its conditions externally to one another, therefore in space and no longer in pure duration. The problem of freedom has thus sprung from a misunderstanding; it has been to the moderns what the paradoxes of the Eleatics were to the ancients, and, like these paradoxes, it has its origin in the illusion through which we

¹ *Op. cit.*, pp. 231-32.

confuse succession and simultaneity, duration and extensity, quality and quantity.¹

In whatever way, in a word, freedom is viewed, it cannot be denied except on condition of identifying time with space; it cannot be defined except on condition of demanding that space should adequately represent time; it cannot be argued about in one sense or the other except on condition of previously confusing succession and simultaneity. All determinism will thus be refuted by experience, but every attempt to define freedom will open the way to determinism.²

Certainly we are under a great obligation to Bergson for stating so clearly the dilemma of the mind that is both religious and scientific. The fact stands out—amazing, fascinating. In the great moments of life we know ourselves to be free, but we can give no account of the experience in definite description, without, *ipso facto*, showing the whole experience to be utterly determined, step by step, element by element, in unbroken and unbreakable succession of cause and effect, condition and consequence. We know our own free act as free and spontaneous, but the moment we reflect upon it our freedom utterly vanishes. The Greeks began this baffling quest by finding the world, self-contradictingly, both spirit and matter, both spontaneous and machine-like, both fortuitous congeries of soulless atoms and meaningful system of events and ends. For us moderns the struggle of the two motifs has been, by psychology, reduced to the more bitterly contested arena of inner experience. That this is the core, the crux, of the religious problem, there can be no doubt. The fact that Bergson has put his finger so definitely and clearly upon it and has offered an apparently promissive solution is ample explanation of his great popularity with thoughtful religious people.

Let me anticipate here, for the sake of clearness and emphasis, the point which I hope to make at the conclusion of this chapter. Bergson's problem turns upon this *transition made by imperceptible steps* from intuition to intellect, from the mystical to the mechanistic type of cognitional consciousness. The question is, Are these steps really imperceptible? In spite of the fact that in many places Bergson speaks of intuition (or instinct) and intellect as

¹ *Op. cit.*, pp. 238-40 (italics mine).

² *Op. cit.*, p. 230.

fused and blended in every moment of consciousness (and so, one would think, amenable to close psychological scrutiny and possible disentanglement), he has conceived of them, in his metaphysics, as so profoundly different in their respective natures that any actual psychological account of the "transition," any analysis of the "steps," from intuitional to intellectual operations is simply out of the question. If his psychology had been adequate to the task of analyzing these so-called "imperceptible steps," would not his metaphysical account of the gulf between instinct and intellect have been quite uncalled for? In other words, if the gulf which seems to yawn between them could be seen, by psychological analysis, to be filled with a series of conscious states differing not in kind but only in innumerable delicate degrees, no metaphysical explanation would be required, for the gulf would not exist. *A more adequate psychology would render unnecessary a more "subtle metaphysic."* This doubtless is the direction in which an empirical theology must look for light on its primary problem, the mechanical-mystical dilemma.

What then is the explanation which Bergson gives of this peculiarity of human experience, that by a kind of mystical direct apprehension we grasp the reality of spontaneity and freedom but by every act of intellectual reflection thereon we inevitably cognize our acts and thoughts as utterly determined, of this "illusion through which we confuse succession and simultaneity, duration and extensity, quality and quantity," of the fact that "the transition is made by imperceptible steps from concrete duration, whose elements permeate one another, to symbolical duration, whose elements are set out side by side"?

The explanation is, briefly, as follows:

The Original Impetus, the *Élan vital*, the primordial "consciousness," like a jet of steam, becomes "congealed" into a kind of inert negation of itself; falls back, as it were, upon itself and so offers a kind of resistance and obstruction to its own free movement. This "inverse movement" of "consciousness" is "matter." But the *Élan vital* pushes its way into matter, retarding its "inverse" tendency, in part held back by it and in part carrying it along on its own current. In this partial imprisoning of the Impetus by its

inverse movement, in this organization of inert matter by "consciousness," consists what we mean by "life." Life takes three directions—torpor, instinct, intellect. These, it is important to note, are not successive stages or levels but parallel branches of evolution. The contrasted characters of instinct and intellect are explained on the ground that in its progress life as instinct has been turned inward upon itself, whereas life as intellect has been turned toward matter. Instinct has thus a power of getting directly at the secrets of vital processes, whereas intellect must play forever upon the surface of living things as upon the surface of inert solids.

The following citations (from Mitchell's translation of *Creative Evolution*) will make clear the foregoing interpretation.

Consciousness, or supraconsciousness, is the name for the rocket whose extinguished fragments fall back as matter; consciousness again is the name for that which subsists of the rocket itself passing through the fragments and lighting them up into organisms [p. 261].

Life appears in its entirety as an immense wave which starting from a centre spreads outwards and which on almost the whole of its circumference is stopped and converted into oscillation [p. 266].

That undivided movement of descent which is materiality itself [p. 271].

The double form of consciousness is then due to the double form of the real, and theory of knowledge must be dependent upon metaphysics [p. 178].

Vegetative torpor, instinct, and intelligence—these, then, are the elements that coincided in the vital impulsion common to plants and animals, and which, in the course of a development in which they were made manifest in most unforeseen forms, have been dissociated by the very fact of their growth. *The cardinal error which, from Aristotle onwards, has vitiated most of the philosophies of nature is to see in vegetative, instinctive, and rational life, three successive degrees of the development of one and the same tendency, whereas they are three divergent directions of an activity which has split up as it grew.* The difference between them is not a difference of intensity, nor, more generally, of degree, but of kind [p. 135].

One of the clearest results of biology has been to show that evolution has taken place along divergent lines. It is at the extremity of two of these lines—the two principal—that we find intelligence and instinct in forms almost pure [p. 175].

Intuition and intellect represent two opposite directions of the work of consciousness: intuition goes in the very direction of life itself; intellect goes in the inverse direction and thus finds itself naturally in accordance with the movement of matter [p. 267].

Instinct and intellect are two divergent developments of one and the same principle, which in the one case remains within itself, in the other steps out of itself and becomes absorbed in the utilization of inert matter. This gradual divergence testifies to a radical incompatibility and points to the fact that it is impossible for intelligence to reabsorb instinct. That which is instinctive in instinct cannot be expressed in terms of intelligence [p. 167].

Consciousness is essentially free; it is freedom itself; but it cannot pass through matter without settling on it, without adapting itself to it. This adaptation is what we call intellectuality [p. 270].

The intellect has been cut out of it [life] by a process resembling that which has generated matter [p. 268].

If consciousness has thus split up into intuition and intelligence it is because of the need it had to apply itself to matter at the same time as it had to follow the stream of life [p. 178].

The success of physics would be inexplicable, if the movement which constitutes materiality were not the same movement which, prolonged by us to its end, that is to say, to homogeneous space, results in making us count, measure, follow in their respective variations terms that are functions one of another. To effect this prolongation of the movement, our intellect has only to let itself go, for it runs naturally to space and mathematics, intellectuality and materiality being of the same nature and having been produced in the same way [p. 219].

For—we cannot too often repeat it—intelligence and instinct are turned in opposite directions, the former toward inert matter, the latter toward life. Intelligence, by means of science, which is its work, will deliver up to us more and more the secret of physical operations; of life it brings us, and, moreover, only claims to bring us, a translation in terms of inertia. It goes all around life, taking from outside the greatest possible number of views of it, drawing it into itself instead of entering into it. But it is to the very inwardness of life that intuition leads us [p. 176].

The intellectual representation of continuity is negative, being at bottom only the refusal of our mind before any actually given system of decomposition to regard it as the only possible one. *Of the discontinuous alone does the intellect form a clear idea* [p. 154].

Of immobility alone does the intellect form a clear idea [p. 155].

The intellect is characterized by a natural inability to comprehend life [p. 165].

The main purpose of the present discussion is to point out, first, that Bergson's philosophy has the inveterate mechanical-mystical dilemma as its central problem; then, that his discussion which begins with psychological analysis (the third level, upon which the problem has gained a footing since Kant's great innovation)

is soon forced to re-enter the metaphysical realm because of the inadequacy of this psychological analysis; and, finally, to suggest, against this background, the direction in which a more tenacious and consistent psychological investigation must probably proceed in order to overcome this deficiency, and thus enable empirical theology to come to terms with science upon ground that is itself a proper subject for strictly scientific treatment. A criticism of the Bergsonian metaphysics, therefore, is beside the mark. It is, however, pertinent to the main issue to note at least one point (a pivotal point it is) in which the metaphysics most obviously points to an unsolved psychological problem, and to indicate how unsatisfactory the proffered metaphysical solution is. And the point in question is not merely a pivotal point so far as Bergson's treatment of this religious problem is concerned; it is likewise essential to his treatment of the other, the epistemological, phase of that great underlying self-and-nature dualism which, as I indicated at the outset, is the most important motif of modern philosophy. I refer to his doctrine of the relation between the spatiality of matter and the spatiality of the intellect. Note the following characteristic statements:¹ "Determinations of space or categories of the understanding, whichever we will, spatiality and intellectuality being moulded on each other" (p. 257). "Intellectuality and materiality have been constituted in detail by reciprocal adaptation" (p. 186). "The division of unorganized matter into separate bodies is relative to our senses and to our intellect, and matter, looked at as an indivisible whole must be a flux rather than a thing" (p. 186). "It is our perception which cuts inert matter into distinct bodies" (p. 227). But compare with these last two statements the following: "Things have a natural tendency to fit into a frame of this kind." "A certain natural geometry suggested by the most general and immediately perceived properties of solids" (p. 161). In a word, space is partly real and partly ideal; matter has a "certain natural geometry," and "all the operations of our intellect tend to geometry." "When we observe that a thing really *is* there where it *acts*, we shall be led to say (as Faraday was) that all the atoms interpenetrate and

¹ Mitchell's translation of *Creative Evolution*.

that each of them fills the world. On such a hypothesis, the atom, or more generally the material point, becomes simply a view of the mind, a view which we come to take when we continue far enough the work (wholly relative to our faculty of acting) by which we subdivide matter into bodies. Yet it is undeniable that matter lends itself to this subdivision, and that in supposing it breakable into parts external to one another, we are constructing a science sufficiently representative of the real" (p. 203).

And what is the explanation of this reciprocal spatiality of matter and intellect? The most concise statement is the following: "The space of our geometry and the spatiality of things are mutually engendered by the reciprocal action and reaction of two terms which are essentially the same, but which move each in the direction inverse of the other . . . ,"¹ a statement which neither in itself nor in its thirty-odd pages of exposition is very illuminating or convincing. But—and this is the important thing—Bergson's treatment suggests here the very point at which the problem of knowledge needs most to be attacked. "This long analysis was necessary to show how the real can pass from tension to extension and from freedom to mechanical necessity by way of inversion."² But this analysis *begins* with a little psychological introspection.³ Query: Might not a more thoroughgoing psychology, genetic as well as introspective, with the aid of physics, give us a more empirical and hence a more useful account of this undeniable reciprocity of spatiality, of quantityness, between thought and things, which is the strength of exact science and the stronghold of realism?

Let us now note some general aspects of Bergson's psychology. Probably its chief point of inadequacy is its lack of an appreciation of the instinctive nature and primary importance of social experience. For Bergson the individual seems to be primary and social consciousness secondary. This inadequacy is of special importance in connection with the question of the *self*. What is the "fundamental self" and what are the "parasitic selves" of which he

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 202. This recalls the similar fashion in which Aristotle resolved the dilemma as it shaped itself in his time, namely the skilful playing upon one another of two mutually necessary and strictly complementary conceptions.

² *Op. cit.*, p. 236.

³ *Op. cit.*, pp. 199-220.

speaks so often? Here one cannot but observe how little Bergson appreciates the part which social experience plays in the actualization of any real selfhood. For him the parasitic self is the "spatialized," that is, social, self. The fundamental self is essentially non-social.

As the self thus refracted and thereby broken to pieces is much better adapted to the requirements of social life in general and language in particular, consciousness prefers it and gradually loses sight of the fundamental self. Below the self with well-defined states, a self in which *succeeding each other* means *melting into one another*, and forming an organic whole. . . . But we are generally content with the first, i.e., with the shadow of the self projected into homogeneous space.¹ . . . In order to recover this fundamental self, as the unsophisticated consciousness would perceive it, a vigorous effort of analysis is necessary, which will isolate the fluid inner states from their image, first refracted, then solidified, in homogeneous space.²

But to discover the "fundamental self" by withdrawing from all human intercourse, surely that is impossible. Yet Bergson is certainly right in insisting that if we are to get to the bottom of life's problem we must discover the fundamental self and assign it a rightful sway over the parasitic selves. That indeed is a most important point for the philosophy of religion. But an empirical procedure would surely require every man to answer the question, what is *for him* his fundamental self? If the psychologist can discover any unanimity in the results of such an inquiry, well and good—such a definition may be taken as authoritative. But the futility of looking for a self that is just itself, a pure, isolated, unconditioned self, surely is apparent. The great question is, In what situation is the self most active, most free, most alive? What is the most vital relationship in which we find it? When is a man most truly himself? Even our freedom, whenever and however deeply experienced, is never an utterly relationless freedom. We are free for something, from something, to do something, to be something. Just sheer unadulterated freedom is the barest abstraction. And furthermore, it may well be that the less important phases of life are not so much parasitic selves as conditioning and contributing selves. The fundamental self is the organizing

¹ *Time and Free Will*, p. 128.

² *Ibid.*, p. 129.

self, the dominating self, the integrating and unifying self, the self of most vital function.

The psychology of Bergson, then, has this crucial defect of isolating the self. But this is a twofold isolation. In the first place the self is regarded as fundamentally individual, atomistic. The social self is a "parasitic self." The "real self" is a self which can never be known in social, that is, spatialized, experience. In the second place the "real self" is still further isolated within the larger and more "spatial" phases of even personal experience. To find this real self one must turn in upon the deepest of "deep-seated psychic states." Now this is a most interesting counterpart of the Cartesian self. The self which has figured strategically in the post-Cartesian epistemological discussions is the knowing self. *Cogito, ergo sum*. The real self is the self of cognitive function. This cognizing self has been isolated within the vague general matrix of experience, and from this isolation have grown the whole brood of epistemological perplexities. But for Bergson the isolated self is the exact opposite of the Cartesian cognizing self. It is the self which does not cognize but feels, intuitively. But the isolation is no less extreme and no less troublesome. For the Cartesian the fatal difficulty is to pass from the acts of the isolated cognizing self to the common-sense, everyday acts and experiences of the human organism. For Bergson the difficulty is to pass from the acts of the isolated *pure durational* self to commonplace knowledge and social, spatial experience. In this Bergson is, though apparently so far removed from the traditional epistemologists, really at one with them. Likewise he is at one with them in isolating the self from the social organism of which it is an integral part. The two sorts of isolation, however, are practically the same. It is a severing of the vital ties between the so-called real self and its supposedly less real experience. The importance of this point cannot be overestimated. With such a psychology no one can possibly escape the necessity of seeking in metaphysics a cure of the troubles which follow in its train. It surely is obvious that since such an isolation of the self is artificial any other solution than an undoing of this isolation is bound to be artificial. If this isolation be frankly denied, the passing by "imperceptible" steps from

the experience of the so-called real self to that of the so-called parasitic self is not a mystery to be solved by a "subtle metaphysics," but a process capable of psychological analysis.

There is another most important point in which Bergson has failed to scrutinize closely enough the actually observable workings of the human mind. The business of the intellect, he insists, is to facilitate our actions upon solids. In this, and in so far, he is an "instrumentalist." But he stops far short of the broad truth recognized today by many American psychologists and logicians, namely, that intellectual processes are "instrumental" not only for action upon solids but for all desired ends, whether they be ethical, religious, political, or physical. Not only so, but these "instrumental" forms of consciousness are not merely spatial in their essential character; rather they are "abstract"—this is their very usefulness, in that irrelevant characteristics of things and events are *pro tempore* ignored, and only the one or the few characteristics of those things or events which are of supreme importance *in the situation* are emphasized or even noticed. No doubt the spatializing, unitizing type of "abstraction" is of tremendous importance; but the "intellectual" processes are not necessarily only spatial. "Spatiality" is no doubt a conspicuous character of "intellectuality," but by no means all of it. And "fabrication," action upon solids, is no doubt a conspicuous example of instrumental consciousness, but it by no means monopolizes it.

But not only is Bergson's metaphysics made necessary by the inadequacy of his psychology; not only is this metaphysics quite unconvincing, especially in such a central matter as the theory of "inversion"; but the basic distinction between instinct and intellect leads logically to the most undesirable practical consequences. The isolation of the intuitional self from the intellectual self, in spite of the "subtle metaphysics" which seeks to reveal their underlying unity, continues the divorce of religion and science; and the isolation of the real self from the social self continues the divorce between religion and social endeavor. Social life, civilization, the technique of progress, are obviously dependent upon the intellect. All mystical experience, all sense of freedom and spontaneity, all direct sense of the original life, these, for Bergsonism, are functions

of intuition. To save our souls we must renounce the world. There is no idea of a corporate salvation. The fusion of scientific social service and religious enthusiasm is logically impossible. But this means ethical apriorism, religious fanaticism, and socially barren intellectualism. To separate the real self and the social self, the self of intuition and the self of collective endeavor, is to divorce the vision of God and the task of civilization, to paralyze the Christian conscience, to quench the dream of the twentieth-century religion of a "new heaven and a new earth wherein dwelleth righteousness."

To summarize the foregoing discussion of Bergson: His philosophy is primarily an effort to resolve the mechanical-mystical dilemma upon the plane of constructive idealism (the third level on which this ancient perplexity has moved). This task evidently calls for a psychological examination of the antagonistic mechanizing and mysticizing activities of consciousness, and an attempt to find some underlying unity of the two tendencies. Bergson, however, has recourse to a so-called intuitional metaphysics to supplement his psychology ("theory of knowledge and theory of life" seeming to him to be "inseparable"). The real reason, however, why he so soon falls back upon metaphysics probably is that his psychology is fundamentally inadequate. As it is, the core of his metaphysical explanation, the theory of "inversion," is not by any means convincing, and the dualism of intuition and intellect is not sufficiently mitigated by Bergson's theory of evolution to remove the unfortunate practical dualism of religion and science, religion and social endeavor. What then are the chief points of inadequacy in the psychology with which Bergson approaches the mechanical-mystical problem? There are four such points: (a) the individual self is too much isolated from its real social matrix; (b) the "instrumental" character of intellectual processes is too closely restricted, being affirmed only of the consciousness accompanying our action on solids; (c) the instinctive-intuitional and the intellectual phases of consciousness are too rigidly distinguished, even though their fusion in common experience is admitted; (d) no effort is made toward a genuinely genetic psychological study of the "undeniable" mystery of a mutual spatiality in thought and things, but instead

we are given a purely speculative account of the common genesis of intellect and matter.

Of the first two of these four defects we have in contemporary American thought abundant correction: of the first in our social psychology¹ and of the second in the literature of "experimental logic."² Some of the discussions in the latter have a bearing also upon the third point.³ But so far as I am aware the last two difficulties have not been discussed in any way that throws light upon the problem of religion. It is the question involved in the third of the four points urged here against Bergson's psychology that is most crucial for the primary phase of the problem of religion, which is, as this and the preceding chapter have maintained, the mechanical-mystical dilemma. I have already stated the issue.⁴ It amounts simply to this: ignoring for the time being the question as to which of the two types of cognitional consciousness gives us the nearer approach to reality, we are primarily concerned to understand how or why we do move from one type to the other, how they are related to each other, what, in a word, the "imperceptible steps" actually are by means of which we pass from the moment of "practical reason" to that of "pure reason," from that of "duration" to that of "spatiality," from the mystical to the mechanical, from religion to science. For surely these are not two incommensurable activities of a divided ego, but are part and parcel of each other, inextricably interwoven, fused by innumerable connective activities, with which they are continuous, into an integral organic consciousness.

¹ E.g., Cooley, *Social Organization; Human Nature and the Social Order*.

² E.g., Dewey, et al., *Studies in Logical Theory*; Moore, "Existence, Meaning, and Reality," Decennial Publications of the University of Chicago, First Series, Vol. III.

³ E.g., Moore, chapter entitled "The Reformation of Logic," in *Creative Intelligence*, p. 75.

⁴ *Supra*, p. 67.

CHAPTER V

CONCERNING METHOD

I have pointed out that the inveterate mechanistic-mystical dilemma, which seems to be the crux of the religious problem, especially as it presents itself today under the general antithesis of the religious and the scientific view of the world, now, with Bergson's treatment before us, demands the following formulation: First, how shall we understand the underlying unity of the mind's operations which give us on the one hand a mystical and on the other a mechanistic interpretation of the world, since we cannot be content to leave these two antithetical types of mental operation in a hopeless dualism? Bergson's theory of the original bifurcation of instinct and intellect in the evolutionary process whereby the *Élan vital* creates its way through the resistance of matter has suggested that probably a more adequate psychological examination of the contrasted operations of intuition and intellect would make unnecessary the "subtle metaphysic" which Bergson proposes as an explanation of the ultimate unity of these two types of experience.

In the second place, how shall we understand the underlying linkage between our intellectual cognitions and the material world with which they, in exact science, so successfully deal? (This phase of the problem is dealt with in Bergson's theory of "inversion," which holds that "intellectuality and materiality have been constituted in detail by reciprocal adaptation.")¹ Assuming that the organic solidarity of intuition and intellect could be revealed by psychology, how can this organically unitary knowledge-activity be seen as linked up inseparably with the whole substructure of our experienced world? For linked up in some intimate fashion it certainly is, upon the testimony of common sense, the exact sciences, and the whole realistic tendency in philosophy. If, now, such linkage could at last be brought to light by psychological analysis, there

¹ *Creative Evolution*, p. 186.

would then appear a real continuum embracing what realism would call the "independent reality," our mechanical-mathematical cognitions thereof, and our mystical interpretation of the whole. In other words, the ancient dilemma would be resolved, for there would no longer be a question as to which is more true, our mechanical or our mystical interpretations of "reality," but only as to what sort of interpretation carries reality farthest in its unfolding through human reconstruction. Or, to put it otherwise, we would no longer orient human interpretation as apposed, in its double aspect, to "reality," but rather as existing in the living midst of that reality, a dynamic integral part thereof.

So much for a condensed statement of the problem. The next question is, Can psychology give us an answer as trustworthy as the results of scientific investigation in other fields? If our theology is to be truly empirical, it must work with scientific tools. Certainly the progress of experimental psychology in recent years should encourage us to hope that the questions suggested above may find at last adequate scientific treatment. Though the experimental method as applied to cognitional and allied forms of conscious experience is still in a somewhat chaotic condition, it is certainly becoming more and more an exact science, and to it we must look for the assured results which dialectic and speculation have failed to furnish.

Probably such an inquiry as is here suggested would deal with such points as the following: What are the various stages and factors in the perceptual and conceptual apprehensions of *motion* as they approximate toward the mechanistic or the mystical types respectively? Probably analysis will show that there are three broad ways in which motion as such is denuded of mystical meaning: (a) the evaporation, so to speak, of immediate emotional interest through mere familiarity; (b) the same result through a long regressus of causal explanations, that is, the dedynamizing of the immediately perceived motion through more or less remote conceptual forms of movement or change; (c) the assignment of a supernatural cause, robbing the motion thus of its intrinsic interest. The opposite tendency will probably be seen to comprise such factors as these: (a) the enhancement of emotional appraisal

through the relevance of the motion in question to vital and instinctive interests; (b) the tendency to clothe the motion or movements alluded to with "tertiary" qualities through the inevitably stimulated kinaesthetic imagery and sensations; (c) the reinforcement of such a tendency by the *social* imagery which these emotional and kinaesthetic factors usually arouse through vague association.

Again, what are the stages and factors in the two opposite tendencies which center, in unstable equilibrium, so to speak, in the quantity-quality perceptions which bulk so large in common experience, especially the visual and tactual kinaesthetic complexes with their spatial and other components; the stuff of "primary" and "secondary" qualities? Probably, in the one, the abstracting function of attention will be found to be the controlling factor, while in the other the feeling-tones and the emotional elements into which they so readily pass or with which they fuse will be the most important point for study.

Again, how do the imagery and reactions appropriate to our contact with the physical environment become complicated with the imagery and reactions appropriate to our contact with the social environment, and vice versa? How, in its many phases or degrees, does personal feeling wax and wane as we adjust ourselves to the people about us, displacing, as it waxes, the non-personal or mere *thing*-feeling, and reinforcing itself with the latter as it wanes? And how, on the other hand, does the *non-personal* feeling, the *thing*-attitude, wax and wane, with its varying *personal* feeling complementation, as we adjust ourselves to the inanimate objects and animals about us? Obviously habit and novelty, the thwarting or forwarding of our activities by the objects of our environment, directness and indirectness of interest—such factors are here of great importance.

More specifically the two categories of causation and purpose will be in special need of such a psychological examination. Instead of two conceptions of causation, the anthropopathic notion, composed mostly of the "feeling of effort," and the mathematical notion of "function," are there many vaguely different, intermediate sorts of conception? A careful examination will probably discover that

there are. What are they, and under what conditions do they arise? And how many varieties of finalistic conception are there, and how does the mind pass through the various stages, from the crudest *anthropoteleism* to what Bergson would call "radical finalism"? What are the situations in which the various types are elicited? And, again, what light can this sort of psychological approach throw upon the whole matter of "existence" and "value"? Are these, also, but foci, so to speak, around which the ellipse of conscious experience swings, "value" judgments and attitudes always tinged, though sometimes in the minutest degree, with the "existence" quality, "existence" judgments and perceptions always colored, though sometimes also in slight degree, by the "value" factor? And if so, what, once more, are the various determining conditions of the proportions of the elements in the complex?

For the present I can only express my conviction that such a method of approach is as promiseful as it is necessary and would prove not only an entirely new but an extremely important factor in any adequate statement of the religious situation; for it would doubtless make clear what, since Kant's time, men have more or less dimly apprehended, namely, that the antagonism of religion and science is due to highly contrasted methods of cognition, which, however, are somehow continuous with each other, unless the mind be a house hopelessly divided against itself.

In the meantime let us note that "functional" psychology and the so-called "empirical" logic which rests immediately upon it have pioneered a path in the same general direction as that indicated above. Its bearing upon the philosophy of religion can perhaps be most briefly pointed out by passing at once to a consideration of some contrasts between pragmatism and the other dominant philosophies of the day (for pragmatism is in philosophy what functionalism is in psychology and empiricism is in logic). And probably the contrast most closely relevant to our subject is that involved in the discussion of the so-called "ego-centric predication."¹ It constitutes a chief bone of contention between realism

¹ See Perry, *Present Philosophical Tendencies*, pp. 129 ff.; also *Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Method*, VII.

and idealism and as such serves well to clarify the position of pragmatism as contrasted with both.

Both realism and idealism seek *in primis* for what we might call the citadel of consciousness, the very core of cognition. This for both of them is *the act of pure knowledge*, that is, knowledge of the formal logic type, of the self-evident kind, of the sort that has an inherent authenticity. Take, for instance, the point from which Bradley begins in building up his system of metaphysics and note how it is just what I have called the citadel of consciousness. "To think is to judge, and to judge is to criticise, and to criticise is to use a criterion of reality. And surely to doubt this would be mere blindness or confused self-deception. But if so, it is clear that, in rejecting the inconsistent as appearance, we are applying a positive knowledge of the ultimate nature of things. Ultimate reality is such that it does not contradict itself; here is an absolute criterion."¹ On the other hand, take such a statement as the following on the side of realism: "The ultimate terms of knowledge are the terms that survive an analysis that has been carried as far as it is possible to carry it."² Logical analysis, then, is the very ideal of knowledge for both philosophies. And, so to speak, around this citadel a moat is dug, an important separation between this pure knowledge and the innumerable varieties of mere "psychological" knowledge, which, indeed, is dangerous ground, infested with the sources of error. The depth of this moat is greater than the enemies of truth suppose; that is just its practical importance. For though neo-realism professes to treat knowledge "as a natural event" and bridges the gap between logical knowledge and psychological knowledge by means of a nervous system, stimulus-and-response, etc., this bridge is truly a drawbridge, for while contact with non-logical experience seems plausible enough as a part of this philosophy, for strategical purposes the connection is actually severed.³ Similarly Bradley, while admitting other possible criteria of reality, practically and indeed explicitly makes the difference between them and the one taken as the fundamental criterion a difference of kind and not of degree. If, then, the real center of knowledge is an

¹ *Appearance and Reality*, p. 136.

² *The New Realism*, p. 32.

³ On this point compare Moore in *Creative Intelligence*, pp. 105 f.

isolated logical judgment, we have indeed a "predicament." But, as it seems to the pragmatist, it is a predicament for the idealist no less than for the realist. For the former the difficulty is to conceive reality, as apprehended from this logical center, as in any degree more attractive than a cosmic abstraction.¹ For the realist, however, the "predicament" is no less embarrassing; for his object is not to prove the ultimately purposeful character of reality, since his preoccupation is with science and not with religion, but to show how the real can be discovered as independent of experience. Realism seeks an existential sort of independence in reality and cannot find it. Idealism finds a qualitative sort of independence in the absolute reality and does not want it. And (we cannot repeat it too often) the core of the trouble is that both have really *dissociated* logical knowledge and non-logical experience. And so the predicament is not that our human world is ego-centric, but that these philosophies have assigned an arbitrary circumference to the cognitive experience from within which our exploration and discovery of reality must obviously begin. At the core Bergsonism, idealism, and realism have this common trait—they assume, as a basic factor in their technique of discussion, a hiatus between pure intellect and merely "psychological" experience.

Pragmatism would say, then, that the solution of the deadlock must and does come from removing that arbitrary and entirely artificial delimitation of intellect. That is done by doing more thoroughly what realism purports to do, namely, by regarding knowledge as a "natural event"; that is, by taking our functional social psychology all the way with us and refusing to drop it when formal logic steps in and says "thus far and no farther." In other words, we must dig no moat about the citadel of pure knowledge, because, forsooth, pure knowledge, or logical thought, is not a citadel at all. The real tactics of the intellectual life are indeed more akin to modern methods of warfare than to mediaeval. Not even the mathematician locks himself in an immovable and impregnable thought-fortress, but "digs himself in" at whatever point his

¹ See, for instance, chap. xxvii, "Ultimate Doubts," in Bradley's *Appearance and Reality*. Royce is finally no more successful in demonstrating an absolute which is not merely abstract and logical.

obstacles threaten his advance. That is just what we are all doing in all intellectual effort—when face to face with problems we intrench ourselves in those aspects or phases of our whole experience which seem at the time to be steadfast and secure and attack the uncertainties and perplexities with what seem to be the most available or most effective weapons with which our conscious experience has furnished us. We are “instrumentalists” in practice, whether we are such in theory or not.

We must, I said, dig no moat around “pure knowledge”; which means that the conception with which psychology furnishes us is of cognitive activities that are inextricably intermingled with other activities of perceptual, sensational, and emotional sorts, which activities in turn are no less inextricably interwoven in the dynamic structure of our far-reaching environment. In a word, the physical-psychical-social organism we call man is in dynamic connection with his environment, and within his complex conscious experience there are everywhere dynamic functional connections between the most abstract and the most emotional phases of experience and those more elementary phases which we call motor, sensory, and perceptual. There are no structural cleavages between environment and organism nor within the conscious processes of the organism.¹

But, some will object, this functionalism goes too far. It psychologizes all entities into “instruments,” all facts into useful fictions, all attainments into adjustments. Instead of exploring the ontologically solid shores of reality, we are kept forever floundering in a sea

¹ For a characteristic statement of this so-called functional point of view see Irving Miller, *The Psychology of Thinking*, especially chap. vi. Note also the following statements, from the “empirical logic” point of view, as represented in A. W. Moore’s article, “The Reformation of Logic,” in *Creative Intelligence*: “The operations of habit, instinct, perceptions, memory, and anticipation *become* logical when instead of operating as direct stimuli they are employed in a process of inquiry” (p. 82). “The conditions under which non-logical conduct *becomes* logical. . . . The transformation begins at the point where non-logical processes instead of operating as direct unambiguous stimuli and response become ambiguous with consequent inhibition of conduct. . . . This modification of form and function constitutes ‘reason’ or better reasoning” (p. 83). “It is important to observe that these forms of interaction—instinct and habit, perception, memory, etc.—are not to be located in either of the interacting beings [the organism and the environment] *but are functions of both*. The conception of these operations as the private functions of an organism is the forerunner of the epistemological predicament” (p. 84; italics mine).

of words. For these many centuries the profoundest philosophers and the devoutest souls have been seeking permanence in the midst of change, unity in the midst of plurality, purpose in the midst of mechanism; but now this instrumentalist doctrine gives us all and nothing. For our monisms become useless once they are shown to be valid only because and in so far as they are useful; permanence is shown to be only a relative permanence; and all our faith in teleology is shown to be but the by-product of imagination in its service of biological and social adjustment. Every adjustment remakes both the environment and the organism, and nothing abides but adjustment, adjustment and yet more adjustment!

Is there then nothing to which we may assign some abiding metaphysical status? Let us avoid phenomenism by assigning the metaphysical quality of "reality" to the *whole* of our experience, at a lump sum, at a stroke. Let us stop talking about our experience *of* reality and talk of experience *as* reality. We shall thus have to recognize that in spots, as it were, this real total experience gives us a kind of trouble which we have been wont to call unrealness. The simplest diagnosis of this trouble is that various elements of experience are discovered to fall apart or to become frictional among themselves. The established connections of the multifarious elements of experience are found to be ruptured. In other words, we find that some part, usually a comparatively small part, of experience has become "problem." The larger part which retains its stability remains "real." In everyday language we call this intact portion "fact." The specifically reflective process of thought then begins and consists essentially in an examination of the dislocated elements of our experience to discover where the tension begins, what are the factors most under strain, and to attempt various modifications of the involved elements in the effort to restore the normal condition of unstrained interaction. The organic vitality of experience is such that it is autotherapeutic. Otherwise it remains dislocated, fractured, and painful, or it grows well, in time, we hardly know how. In any case *experience is reality*, though sometimes a painful or crippled reality. It is on the whole sound, though with parts now here, now there, that are, as it were, out of order.

But, it may be asked, Whence comes this disorder, this dislocation, this fracture? The dislocations, the strains, and the ruptures are due to uneven growth. They are growing pains, indeed. Some part has grown faster, has changed more rapidly, than some other part; the skeleton of science, as it were, is pushing the musculature of morality and religion too hard. Stress and strain, rupture and dislocation, are possible and almost inevitable indeed, just because experience as a whole is growing. There are no unrealities for the static life, if such a thing there be.

Is this, then, subjectivism? No and yes. *And again no.* Let us recall the "ego-centric predicament." We have said that pragmatism insists on allowing no metaphysical cleavage between a so-called independent entity and a cognizing mind. All cognitions, even the most pure logical knowledge acts, are functionally continuous with all sorts of psychological and physiological activities. Ideation is the clearing-house function of the socio-psycho-physical organism. Thoughts are continuous, organically integral, with sensations, conations, and affections. Let there be no doubt on that point. But sensations, conations, and affections are functionally related to, organically part and parcel of, things, events, men, stars. The nervous system is not merely responsive. It is selective and reconstructive. "Stimulus-and-response" realism should not obscure the fact that every psychical or psychological or physiological event is a function of *both* the organism and the environment, of both the stimulus and the stimulated. Experience, particularly knowing, is not something that represents reality or corresponds to reality, but is a *reconstructing* of reality by itself, within itself, in that phase or on that plane or at that juncture which we designate as the cognitive activity or the intellectual process of human life; which means that to assign metaphysical status to any center of reality is as arbitrary as to assign absolute centrality to any organ or function of a living organism. If the heart is the center, what of the brain? If the stomach is the center, what of the sympathetic system? But from the standpoint of the heart's correlations with other structures and with other functions the heart is the center, and from that of the stomach the stomach is the center. So from the standpoint of the correlations of the human

organism with those multitudinous activities of the world within the broad matrix of which its functions operate, from the standpoint of the ego, reality *is* ego-centric. Or, more adequately, from the standpoint of human consciousness reality is *anthropocentric*; and if we try to transcend our human viewpoint we still use it. We are in an "anthropocentric predicament." But shall we call it a "predicament"? If we persist in doing so, it is simply because we cannot school ourselves into relinquishing naïve realism's representational notion of thought and adopting the recreative, reconstructive doctrine which psychology presents.

But if this viewpoint be adopted, what shall we say of truth and error? "Truth" must at once appear to be the character of such reconstructive activities within conscious experience as result in harmonious interaction between the various parts of experience, such, in a word, as make for the total well-being of that conscious nucleus within reality which we humans are. The test of the truth of an idea is its working *within* experience, with other parts of experience, not with things outside of experience. In general, the question of the truth or error of any philosophy or religion must mean its worth as a great reconstructive function within the broad boundaries of common experience. A *true* religion is a *saving* religion. There is no other test, and there never has been. Humanity is too dynamic to accept for long in its soul's concerns any less vital test of truth than it applies to the recipes with which it prepares its food or to the specifications from which it builds its bridges.

But, it may be objected, the saving quality of our specifications for building bridges seems to be objectively conditioned, whereas the saving quality of religious faith seems, in these psychologizing days at least, to be inwardly or subjectively conditioned. Is there not, then, some incongruousness in judging a religion by its results and judging the plan for a bridge likewise by its results? What is at the bottom of this difficulty that common sense seems to feel in such a situation? It is, I think, just this: When the internal dislocations to which I have referred as "problem" situations (the awareness of something "unreal" in our experience)—when these occur, we feel an inward compulsion to follow a certain pretty definite order in our manipulations and reconstructions by means

of which we attempt to restore the equilibrium, the harmony, of our whole experience. What, then, is this order that we feel compelled to follow, and what is the source of the compulsion?

Briefly the order is this: The more usual sensations have a preferential advantage over unusual sensations; habitual attitudes over novel; sensational data over conceptual data (in the sense of "facts" over "theories"); social standards over individual standards; "primary qualities" over "secondary qualities"; visual and tactual experience over auditory; immediate needs over remote ends; safety over mere comfort; quantity over quality; the day's work over the evening's pleasure; the useful over the aesthetic. Such a list could be indefinitely enlarged. The suggestions made are most general. What does this preference mean? "But," an objector interposes, "this order is not universal or constant. Men often choose the beautiful in place of the useful, if they are involved in a clash; men often give the individual's standard right of way over the social standard, even though they be martyred for it; men often prefer the evening's pleasure to the day's work, even though their families go hungry." Even so. And it is just to these exceptions that I shall gladly turn in a moment. But I insist for the present that these preferential advantages are given by most men in most cases. They form the general order of procedure when conflicts must be eliminated in experience; that is, unless reflection can succeed in rearrangement or modification of one or the other or both of the conflicting elements, which is just the business of reflective thinking. But in such reflection the one sort of element *generally* has an advantage. What, I ask, does this preference mean? This, that in the continuous reconstruction of experience by means of and within itself, what we mean by "evolution" is that certain activities precede other activities and so always condition the latter. The order in which our human life has evolved within the cosmic life is the explanation of the fact that in a conflict, say between a toothache and a theory of mental healing, the toothache is very likely to get the right of way. It is easier to modify the theory to accommodate the tooth than to modify the tooth to accommodate the theory. Physical elements show a kind of pre-emption right when spiritual elements seem to collide

with them. It may not be a matter of mere priority or of mere repetition; it may in part be a matter of proportion and organic structure. There is no doubt something more than mere chance in the fact that mathematics is the oldest science and in a sense the normative science. Mathematical science is the ideal of the exact sciences, because, probably, the evolution of our conceptual thinking has had such a life-history that quantitative and spatial thought-forms are indeed nearer to the simpler and more rudimentary reactions between organism and environment than qualitative thought-forms are.¹ In other words, the reconstructive activities of the socio-psycho-physical organism have a life-history that makes some more original, more basic, and others more secondary, more derived. In readjustments within the complex the former have an advantage.

But the order I have spoken of is only general, not universal. The exceptions are notable. In the long run they have often proved the more salutary. The artistic genius who prefers beauty to bread, the martyr who prefers conscience to comfort—these are indeed the great saviors and leaders of humanity. Doubtless the facts revealed in the general rule have their own usefulness. But the only test is value in vital function. The martyrs have demonstrated that the priority of the physical over the spiritual is not necessarily inherently valid. While we do, as a matter of fact, tend to measure the value of any element by comparing it with those which seem to have this (evolutionally conditioned) priority, this tendency has only the sanction of inveteracy, and must be corrected if occasion demand. If occasion demand? And what shall be the criterion? When shall we know that the occasion demands it? And how shall we determine which is right, to follow the common tendency or to take the less usual method of giving precedence to those elements of experience which seem at a disadvantage? Again, there is no standard but the result. Which works best? Which achieves the more desirable results? How shall we use the various instruments which the past and present have prepared for us and put at our disposal? "Who shall arbitrate?"

¹ Recall Bergson's statement that "intellectuality and materiality have been constituted in detail by reciprocal adaptation."

There can be no arbitrament but the results. But how shall we evaluate the results, how compare them? There is but one answer. To put it bluntly, *it is up to us*. We are, it seems, primarily selective organisms, and all that we are, as the past has produced us, must rise up and say what sort of result we most desire. Is it attainable? We can know only by striving for it. What instruments, what "philosophies of life," what faiths, what hypotheses shall we use? Those which experience teaches, as we live and strive, are on the whole, in the long run, for the largest situation, the most serviceable, those which most adequately attain the result we most deeply desire.

We must remember that for no healthy mind does the *whole* of experience ever need to be reorganized and inwardly readjusted. For the most part our experience is sound. We feel it, as a whole, to be real. Our world is always made, for the most part, of fact. All wholesome progress must rest its weight, as it were, upon this mass of fact, of reality. But we are truly pragmatic only so long as we remember that it is not hopelessly final fact, just because it is not independent of our reconstructive vital activities. We can rest upon a great ocean liner—solid and substantial it indeed seems as compared with the unstable waters glimpsed over the rail—not as one might rest in a prison, but as one rests in his home, because we are conscious that even the liner's mighty bulk is in some real degree responsive to our control. In fine, a *fact world* which is *independent* of our experience is as likely to be a hopeless world as a hopeful world. If our intelligence is not creative, reconstructively creative, then, so far as religious interests are concerned, it is an impotent intelligence. Impotent? Then, say some, let us turn to mysticism. Ah, yes, but your mysticism will not find intellect impotent to criticize and destroy. It will undermine the foundations of mysticism almost inevitably. In other words, if intelligence is not creative, then its greatest power is, as the new logic of realism claims, *analytical*. And the only reality which analysis can, in the nature of the case, demonstrate is an abstract, atomistic, quantitative reality. This will satisfy the mechanizing tendencies of the mind but will starve the mystical.

Realism forces on us the enigma of the existence of a trans-empirical object of belief; instrumentalism the question of an empirical objective of belief, a goal in which belief-contents are continually reintegrated. For the instrumentalist the validity of the belief-content is inseparable from the reality of the belief-objective, and the reality of the objective is a matter of concrete experience. To seek it is the only way to prove it. Its *reality* is its *realization*. Even though it is a "flying goal," it is within experience; it is part of a progressive reality. Since it is a part of experience, there is no question of its existence, but only of its worth.

I said that the belief-content is continually reintegrated in the objective of the belief. This is a dynamic aspect, especially of religious experience, and is vital. Let a man believe today that there is a force in nature making for righteousness. The very act of belief is itself a force making for righteousness, and it is a force which stands rooted and grounded in nature. Let a nation go to war to prove that might is not right, that rather right is might, and lo! right becomes might with every blow struck, with every battle fought. In a word, we see a world struggling to renew itself through human moral progress. If men cherish for generations a faith in something they call divine, behold, the world through the power of that faith becomes divine. The more sublimely moral men believe the world-life to be, the more sublimely moral it thereby becomes and is. In so far as we are a humanity believing in God, God *is*, in believing humanity. Our little definitions are brittle and partial. But the sweep of faith in its vast social reaches, its historical self-transformation, its renewing and creative power, is beyond the petty contradictions of its own small parts, which indeed grow just by mutual modification. A world believing in its own spiritual significance *ipso facto* has spiritual significance. In a large and world-historic sense it is at least a minimal truth that the belief in God is self-authenticating. Man has found God by seeking him. Is one's country something real, other than himself? No. Without faith in one's country there is no country. The faith of Americans in America *is* America. The belief-content is reintegrated in the objective and the objective is reintegrated in the

content. The experienced objective is fresh material for belief-content. The enriched content is a new and better instrument for a growing objective.

And so the world's God is one who lives and moves and has his being in his world. He cannot live if the world dies. And the world lives, and lives divinely, if we strive more and more humanly. And we do so strive, if we believe in ourselves.

Do we then believe in ourselves? Do we believe in our better selves, the selves we may become? Does America believe in its better self? Does the world believe in its better self? The only answer is action, choice, decision. History is recording and will appraise the great decisions. The individual, in so far as he can appraise his own choices, does know whether he believes in himself. To anyone but a misanthrope, to anyone who has escaped the malady of him who says, "The more I know of men the more I admire my dog," there is no question as to the moral grandeur of common human life.

Why, then, once more, do men cleave to "the true, the good, the beautiful," following the lure of an ever-unfolding and ever-renewing nobleness? Why do men believe in their better selves? Because, once more, they are selective organisms, and this is what they select. Why try to go behind it? Shall we say that this type of selection is itself the result of "natural selection"? Let us say so. There is something very heartening in such a statement, after all.

But, of course, the notion of "natural selection" is not meant to be heartening. It is a generalization meant for the intellect, not the heart. And so we have "mechanism and mysticism" on our hands again. But if "intelligence" is "creative," let us remember that it is a mystical intelligence as well as a mechanistic intelligence, that it is in some situations extremely mystical, in others extremely mechanistic; in most situations of common life it has any one of many complexions, ranging anywhere from the one extreme to the other. If our social experience is the evolutionary background of the mystical moments, and our manipulation of the physical environment, of the mechanistic moments, and if religion and the religious problem consist fundamentally just in our confronting of the

otherwise physical-seeming world in emotion-provoking situations wherein we irresistibly react with the attitudes, concepts, and feelings of our social dispositions, the assertion of our selfhood—if this is true, then the religious outlook of our day can be nothing less than our purpose to direct, by the most efficient manipulation we can devise, all the energies and activities which enter in any way into our experience toward the realization of those ends which, when our most wholesome self is stirred to appraisal, we are compelled, by the urgency of life within us, to choose and champion. And the sort of thought-forms, whether mathematical or poetical, coldly quantitative or vividly dramatic, which we most habitually use will be determined by the character of that particular small portion of the vast task to which we may have laid our hands.

APPENDIX A

ANIMISM OR "ANIMATISM"

The general viewpoint of this paper should make it clear that it is a mistake to think of animism as characteristic only of primitive peoples. There are animistic impulses in the most sophisticated of us. It is not necessary explicitly to personify a natural object to be animistic. Indeed, complete personification is but the completely organized and consciously maintained stage of the social attitude. It is less correct to say that such vaguely personal feelings and attitudes which modern grown-ups often experience toward nature and natural objects are survivals of animism than to recognize that in the lower races and in children the preponderance of social attitudes as compared with mechanical or non-social attitudes is simply the positive aspect of their lack of corrective experience and mechanical control. The word animism is simply a positive characterization of the tardiness with which the non-social aspects of environment are differentiated from the social. The essential difference between the physical and the social objects in the child's home is the method of control required. The physical object is normally passive and requires only manipulation. The social object is normally active and requires constant readjustment in a ceaseless series of gestures or attitudes or social stimuli or responses. Whenever a physical object behaves in an unexpected or abnormal manner; when, in other words, the customary manipulations or non-social adjustments fail of control, the process of sophistication is arrested, and the social responses or attitudes are elicited. The child is "angry" with the door that slams against him. The savage is "afraid" of the roaring river or the queer-looking rock or the poisonous food. Control breaks down. Habitual adjustments are ineffective. Mere manipulation is inadequate and the whole organism is thrown on the alert. The *dangerous* thing is an "enemy." In the most primitive stages the whole surrounding world of trees, streams, clouds, rocks, storms, winds, etc., being so largely beyond control, evokes the social attitudes because the whole organism is on the *qui vive*. This general social attitude toward nature or the physical environment is animism. As methods of control develop in the race or in the child, the environment becomes differentiated into the social and the non-social. (The question of the differentiation of the social into "human" and "animal" will be referred to in Appendix B.)

Now if animism be understood as the prevalence among primitive peoples of these instinctive social attitudes toward the phenomena of nature, the question whether it is a form of religion will, in the light of my analysis, find a simple answer. Animism is the general field within which develop those more vital adjustments which we call religious ceremonies and beliefs. To try to determine at what stage animism is pre-religious or religion is pre-animistic is an arbitrary proceeding. Logically animism and religion are identical. Practically we are inclined to restrict the name "religion" to the more vital or important examples of the animistic attitude.

APPENDIX B

TOTEMISM

What is the relation between a religious totemism and a possible pre-religious totemism? Now if religion is a social attitude toward the non-human, it may be urged that there never was a time when men were not religious, since the social attitudes are primary. But the beginning of religion will be in the rise of the differentiation between the human and the non-human. "In a pure system of totemism the human and the non-human members . . . are not distinguished" (Cornford, *From Religion to Philosophy*, p. 76). "Every totem clan traverses what seems to us the natural boundary between man and other creatures, and brings a department of nature inside a subdivision of society. . . . It is only when the dim consciousness of a distinction has dawned and the nature and behavior of (say) an emu begin to appear in some degree different from and independent of the nature and behavior of emu-men that the first step is taken on the road to religion" (Cornford, *op. cit.*, p. 91). "This crisis closes the first or pure stage of magic—the birthplace of what is currently called religion" (*ibid.*, p. 92). "In this primary stage we find a pre-religious condition of man-kind; for in the definition of religion we include some representation of a power that is 'not ourselves.'" Logically the religious quality emerges, in social attitudes toward the non-human, with the dawn of a consciousness of its non-humanness; or, to put it otherwise, with the dawn of a human self-consciousness. Cornford, however, confuses religion and morality by failing to analyze into its human and non-human elements that "power not ourselves," a consciousness of which he accepts as the test for the presence of religion. "The collective consciousness is super-individual. It resides of course in the group. . . . In so far as this power is not myself and greater than myself, it is a moral or restraining force which can and does impose upon the individual the necessity of observing the uniform behavior of the group. With the first dawn of a distinction between myself and the social consciousness comes the first shadowy representation which may be called religious or moral" (*op. cit.*, p. 81). Is it not much simpler and more satisfactory to say that in so far as that "power not myself" which controls me is the will or custom of my group, the control is nascently moral, and in so far as that "power not myself," even though mediated by group custom, is really a non-human or superhuman force or principle, the control is of the religious sort?

APPENDIX C

MAGIC

There has been much discussion as to whether magic and religion are identical or different. Ames and King hold that magic is of two sorts, group magic and individual magic, and that the former is religious and the latter non-religious. "Not all magic but only such as belongs to group activities enter into religion" (Ames, *The Psychology of Religious Experience*, p. 110). "Public magic to all intents and purposes is identical with primitive religion. On the other hand, when religion becomes subservient to anti-social or merely private ends, it is scarcely to be distinguished from sorcery" (King, *The Development of Religion*, p. 195). King thus defines sorcery: "The sorcerer is one who deals privately with secret powers, or at least with means not generally known to the group, and the object is almost always private gain or personal vengeance" (*ibid.*, p. 191).

Let me make some further quotations from King, on the basis of which I wish to offer a criticism which will make my own position clearer.

"If these practices [i.e., "the great mass of unreflective spontaneous reactions of the psycho-physical organism"] had chanced to be more closely associated with the evolution of tribal consciousness and tribal interests, they might have furnished the nuclei of rituals and definite religious ideas. If they had been more closely connected with lines of individual interest, so as to furnish a technique available to the individual for carrying out his personal desires, they would have formed the basis of magic" (*ibid.*, p. 189). "Magic is simply primitive man's science, and there is nothing to hinder the tribe from availing itself of the scientific knowledge in the hands of its members. Many social groups may and have adopted magical practices. Magic furnishes the community with a technique for doing many simple things. . . . In communities of loose organization magic might be so thoroughly taken up by the group as to be indistinguishable from religion." Among the North American Indians, in general, "medicine practices cannot be differentiated from religious rites and observances" (*op. cit.*, p. 203).

As to sorcery: "When a man feels he is capable of becoming a sorcerer, he ventures forth quite alone, until he comes to the mouth of the cave where the spirits dwell" (*ibid.*, p. 198). "Having been instructed by the sorcerer in the mysteries of the Great Mother, the master of divination turns him out into the bush all by himself to the contemplation of the mysteries that lie all about him" (*ibid.*, p. 198).

Now if the criterion for the religious quality is the "public and social" character of any activity, and if magic is "public and social," of course it is,

ipso facto, religion. But if we should have reason to feel that private magic also may have a religious aspect, what becomes of the "public and social" criterion? Of course, we may argue in a circle and see religion where we are predisposed to look for it. But I must confess that if I were taking a course in sorcery—standing alone in the mouth of the cave where the spirits dwell—or contemplating the mysteries of the Great Mother all about me, if my experience in such a situation would not be distinctly religious then I do not know what the "feel" of religion is. Has not many a victim been burnt as a sorcerer, only to be recognized by succeeding generations as a martyr to some religious faith? Would it not be more adequate to say that the practitioner of a private magic may be a sorcerer so far as the tribe is concerned, a prophet or priest, a religious person, so far as his relationship with the non-human is concerned? And if his "sorceries," as in the case of North American Indians, should prove beneficial rather than detrimental to the tribe, will he not be recognized as a prophet by his tribe, and no longer called a sorcerer? We have known enough of non-social and even anti-social religion in modern times to enable us to avoid confusing a lack of public spirit with a lack of religion. And when the magic is used by the group, is not its religious quality still due to the same factor as made it religious in the prophet-sorcerer? Moreover, this public magic may be called primitive man's science, if we are thinking merely of the practical results achieved or attempted. Indeed, both public and private magic may be considered as non-religious—a mere customary use of certain formulae or performance of specific acts, out of which the original religious quality has disappeared by sheer weight of habit or absence of cause for emotional interest. Indeed, many magical acts may never have had any religious origin, being simply the repetition of chance "lucky" movements or methods. When, however, by reason of enhanced emotional quality the group consciousness becomes aware of some other-than-the-group force or power, the magical ceremonies take on the religious complexion.

APPENDIX D

MYSTICISM

The union of functional and social psychology which forms the background of my thesis should serve to indicate the normal place of mysticism in religious experience. The primacy of instinctive organic responses, their organization into habit, the production by habit of cerebral processes which we call ideation, the rise of emotion as the accompaniment of the inhibition of action by reason of conflicting tendencies to act, and the solution of the conflict by means of intellectual or ideational processes or reconstructions, the primary preponderance of the social instinctive responses, the tendency of the organism when on the *qui vive*, when subject to intense or vague stimulation, to exhibit the social attitudes, these briefly are facts which underlie the following statement of the place of mysticism in religion.

Pratt, in his *Psychology of Religious Belief*, contrasts three types of religion: that of credulity, that of rationalism, that of feeling. He can, of course, account for the breakdown of the first two, but believes that the third is indispensable and inevitable. He claims that "the whole man should be trusted" (*op. cit.*, p. 27), and the "whole man" will continue to experience "the religion of feeling," in which the "belief in God . . . is . . . a vital rather than a theoretical matter" (*ibid.*, p. 293). Now if my presuppositions are correct, the "whole man" will react to his environment instinctively, correcting his actions by means of the ideational equipment, which he gradually develops and elaborates; in degree as his actions are inhibited by conflicting suggestions, emotion or feeling is aroused; as successful reactions are established in habit, the accompanying ideas are fixed and feeling dies away; as the habitual reactions are rendered futile by some new situation, the ideational accompaniments of these habitual reactions are rendered useless or "false"; the following period of stress and strain is comparatively meager in ideas of any settled quality and rich in the emotional element; the less definite adjustments of the new situation will be preponderantly social in their type. In situations of the less definite, less habitual sort, obviously the inarticulate emotional responses will preponderate, and this is the mystical phase of religion. In the more finished, elaborated adjustments the ideational or intellectual element is prominent, and the feeling factor is relatively small. Furthermore, the vague emotional phase will be normally of the *social* instinctive type, so that in the mystical mood we are aware of a "presence" of some vague sort. This inarticulate awareness tends, of course, to become articulate; the mystical mood will probably leave a creedal deposit of some sort; fervor, to the great disgust of the prophet, tends in the average man to lose itself in a habit or a formula. So Pratt is quite

correct in saying that "the belief in God of the religion of feeling is a vital rather than a theoretical matter"—it is a non-intellectual social response to a vaguely comprehended situation, a social attitude which can find no better explanation of itself than to say that it is aware of a "Presence" in the world in Nature. But he fails entirely to grasp the relative significance of the three types of religion when he puts them in the order of credulity, rationalism, feeling. It would be more accurate to say, that in every religious experience there are normally three stages: first, the feeling stage, in which adjustment has not yet achieved explicit expression; secondly, credulity, in which the ideational accompaniments of adjustment are comparatively crude and uncriticized, relative to the more immediate situation rather than to the larger implications and connections thereof; thirdly, the rational or even rationalistic, in which the ideational factors tend to become more and more elaborate, the situation so familiar as to fail to elicit any great emotional interest, decidedly *other* than what we mean by a "vital" situation. Our present religious situation, to be sure, is one which seems to suggest that hereafter we can have only the "feeling" type of religion, for the new universe in which modern men are trying to make themselves at home is so vast, so many new factors are being revealed almost every day; in a word, the problem situation is so novel, so varied, so boundless, that a well-articulated, compact, fully elaborated ideational adjustment seems almost beyond the range of possibility. Mysticism seems to promise the fullest satisfaction we dare hope for. We can but trust "the whole man" in his deeper, more instinctive, more emotional parts. But the whole man is a thinking organism, and can hardly be expected to be forever content with mere feeling. Mysticism is sure sooner or later to develop a bony framework of ideas. The demands of modern life upon "the whole man" are so great that both endo- and exo-skeletons are imperatively needed if progress is to be achieved in any definable direction, and if we are not to suffer overlong from the buffetings of uncertainty.

The mysticism of the traditional type is accounted for on the same grounds.¹ The stimulation of unusually sensitive personalities by the tremendous social or moral appeal of the Christian divine society, in conjunction with the vagueness and uncertainty which an intangible reality necessarily entailed, logically produced a stress-and-strain situation in which feeling preponderates and clear ideas are impossible. This mood is naturally accentuated by inhibition of action which the saint's withdrawal necessarily produced. In a word, it is a situation in which there is a tremendous stimulation to the social nature, but in which no action is either possible or called for, and hence the floods of feeling and ecstatic experience, and the intense sense of a "Presence."

¹ In chap. III, I distinguish between "classical" or naturalistic mysticism and what I have referred to as the "traditional type," i.e., the supernaturalistic type of mysticism. This distinction does not in any way invalidate the psychological suggestions in this Appendix.

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